The Crisis of Modern Subjectivity: Rethinking Muḥammad Iqbāl and the Islamic Tradition

Muhammad U. Faruque

Abstract: Despite the numerous books and articles on the thought and legacy of Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938), hardly any significant academic studies exist that critically evaluate his philosophical thought in relation to his Muslim predecessors. The present article thus intervenes in the field of Iqbāl studies by challenging current scholarly assessments that present Iqbāl as a heroic reformer of Islam. This article is composed of three parts. It begins by providing a critical review of various scholarly treatments of Iqbāl's reformist thought and draws attention to problematic aspects of the current state of such scholarship. The article then proceeds to examine the ways in which Iqbāl's works frequently misconstrue or misrepresent various premodern Islamic texts and doctrines. It does so in two ways. The first of these involves an examination of Iqbāl's Eurocentric reading of premodern Islamic intellectual traditions and demonstrates that this is not only methodologically problematic but moreover undermined by Iqbāl's own limited grasp of modern scientific theories, such as evolution and the theory of relativity. This is followed by an examination of the concepts of selfhood (*khūdī*) and annihilation of the self (*fanā'*). Prominently featured in Iqbāl's thought and writings, his treatment of these

Muhammad U. Faruque is the Inayat Malik Assistant Professor (2022-) at the University of Cincinnati. His research lies at the intersection of religion, science, philosophy, and literature, especially in relation to the Islamic intellectual tradition. He earned his Ph.D. (with distinction) from the University of California, Berkeley, and served as Exchange Scholar at Harvard University and as George Ames Postdoctoral Fellow at Fordham University. His highly acclaimed book ***Sculpting the Self*** (University of Michigan Press, 2021) addresses "what it means to be human" in a secular, post-Enlightenment world by exploring notions of selfhood and subjectivity in Islamic and non-Islamic literatures including modern philosophy and neuroscience. Faruque's work has been supported by the Templeton Foundation, the Ames Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and the Bestway Foundation, among others and has appeared in numerous peer-reviewed journals such as ***Philosophy East and West***, ***Arabic Sciences and Philosophy*** (Cambridge), ***Brill Journal of Sufi Studies***, ***Religious Studies*** (Cambridge), and ***Ancient Philosophy***. He is also the recipient of numerous awards, grants, and fellowships, including a Templeton Foundation Global Philosophy of Religion Project grant.

Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies, Vol. 6.2, pp. 43–81
 doi:10.2979/jims.6.2.02

two concepts illustrates the problematic aspects of his particular mode of interpreting premodern Islamic philosophy and Sufism. Overall, this article demonstrates that Iqbāl's status as a heroic reformer of Islam is misleading, as his interpretation of the premodern Islamic tradition is not as credible as it has often been presented to be over the past century.

Key words: Muḥammad Iqbāl, *khūdī*, *fanā'*, Islamic reformism, Sufism, Islamic philosophy

Introduction

Despite the numerous books and articles on the thought and legacy of Muhammad Iqbāl (d. 1938), hardly any significant academic studies exist that critically evaluate his philosophical thought in relation to his Muslim predecessors.[1] This is highly significant, since Iqbāl himself claims to have derived the ingredients of his own philosophy from premodern Islamic intellectual traditions. A close reading of Iqbāl's own writings reveals, however, that he often misunderstands classical Islamic thought in a way that undermines his own attempts at rethinking Islam. The task of the present article is thus to intervene in Iqbāl studies by challenging current readings of Iqbāl as a heroic reformer of Islam. More particularly, the present study aims to demonstrate how Iqbāl misconstrues the premodern Islamic intellectual tradition and systematically misinterprets various doctrines to advance his own project of reconstructing Islam in the face of colonial modernity.[2]

By all accounts Muḥammad Iqbāl was a revolutionary figure in the history of Islamic thought.[3] Writing at a crucial juncture of history in colonial India, Iqbāl was at once a poet, philosopher, social commentator, and a part-time politician who wrote on a wide array of topics ranging from intellectual history and economics to science, philosophy of religion, and public policy. With ancestry that could be traced to a Brahmin lineage, Iqbāl was born in 1877 to a devout Sufi family[4] and received his early education and tutelage under Sayyid Mīr Ḥasan (d. 1929) in Sialkot, in contemporary Pakistan.[5] Along with Mīr Ḥasan, other scholars such as Ḍāgh Dihlawī (d. 1905), Shiblī Nuʿmānī (d. 1914), and Thomas Arnold (d. 1930) served as Iqbāl's early mentors, cultivating in him an interest in philosophy, Persian and Urdū poetry, and a keen sense of Islamic history. After obtaining an M.A. in philosophy in 1899 from the prestigious Government College of Lahore, Iqbāl briefly taught university courses in history, philosophy, and economics in Lahore before travelling to Europe, where he would eventually study philosophy at Cambridge University under the prominent idealist philosopher J.M.E. McTaggart (d. 1925). Within three years, Iqbāl graduated from Cambridge with a bachelor's degree, after which he qualified for the bar at London's famous Lincoln's Inn, and eventually earned a

doctorate in Arabic philology[6] from Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (LMU) in Germany. At Cambridge, Iqbāl was exposed to an intellectual environment and made academic connections that would benefit him greatly throughout his life, including with prominent scholars of Sufism and Persian literature such as Edward Granville Browne (d. 1926) and Reynold A. Nicholson (d. 1945), and in 1922 he was knighted by the British Crown for his literary accomplishments. On two additional travels to Europe in 1931 and 1932, Iqbāl met a number of significant personalities such as the evolutionist philosopher of life, Henri Bergson (d. 1941), Louis Massignon (d. 1962), a French scholar of the famed Persian poet and mystic Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d. ca. 922 CE), and the Spanish scholar of Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240 CE), Miguel A. Palacios (d. 1944). It was on this second trip that Iqbāl also had the honor of delivering a lecture at the fifty-fourth session of the Aristotelian Society in London, in June, 1933.[7] Iqbāl's modernist and reformist legacy has had a far-reaching effect, influencing thinkers as diverse as the Islamist idealogue Sayyid Quṭb[8] (d. 1966) and Ḥasan Ḥanafī (b. 1935), a Marxist intellectual who has recently penned a six hundred page work on Iqbāl's philosophy entitled *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Faylasūf al-Dhātīyya* (Muḥammad Iqbāl: Philosopher of the Self).[9]

This brief sketch of Iqbāl's career, connections, and accomplishments is well-known. In what follows, this article attempts to analyze the problematic ways in which Iqbāl's life and works have been received and represented by subsequent generations of writers and scholars. To that end, this article first draws attention to the deeply problematic aspects of the state of Iqbāl scholarship by critically reviewing various scholarly characterizations of Iqbāl's reformist thought. In doing so, it intends to show how such scholarship impedes objective assessments of Iqbāl's engagement with the Islamic tradition. Following that, this article examines Iqbāl's own works in an effort to highlight specific instances in which he misconstrues various classical Islamic texts and doctrines. In particular, this article examines Iqbāl's engagement with Sufi thinkers, including Maḥmūd Shabistarī (d. ca. 1340 CE), ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī (d. 1424 CE), and ʿAbd al-Qādir Bīdil (d. 1720 CE), in order to demonstrate that his understanding of premodern Islamic intellectual traditions was mediocre, at best, and misleading, at worst. This article concludes by reflecting on the implications of these shortcomings, specifically with regard to Iqbāl's ambitious project of reconstructing Islam in light of modern challenges.[10]

Situating Iqbāl and Iqbāl Studies

There are several notable difficulties in Iqbāl scholarship that hinder rigorous academic study of his philosophical thought. This is primarily exacerbated by Iqbāl's status as a national figure and object of adulation, particularly in modern Pakistan. Specifically, within the context of the academy, there are two major

interrelated approaches in Iqbāl studies, both of which are equally problematic. The first of these can be referred to as the adulatory approach, which overstates the novelty and brilliance of Iqbāl's thought. This is distinct from what can be called the nativist or apologetic approach, which attempts to defend and justify Iqbāl's work and philosophy on the basis of his political importance in shaping Muslim identity in South Asia.[11] Various scholarly pronouncements about Iqbāl's significance and intellectual contributions are illustrative of these two approaches. In his survey of modern Muslim thought, Sir H. A. R. Gibb (d. 1971), one of the foremost Orientalist scholars of the twentieth century, praises Iqbāl, stating that while "one looks in vain for any systematic analysis of new currents of thought in the Muslim world … the outstanding exception is . . . Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl, who … faces outright the question of reformulating the basic ideas of Muslim theology."[12] Similarly, another equally respectable scholar of religion and Islam, Wilfred Cantwell Smith (d. 2000), asserts that "although Iqbāl was no theologian, he wrought the most important and the most necessary revolution of modern times. For he made God immanent, not transcendent. For Islam, this is rank heresy; but for today it is the only salvation."[13] Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988), the prominent South Asian scholar of Islam, goes even further in his praise, declaring Iqbāl the only modern Islamic philosopher who "seriously attempted to formulate a new metaphysics with due regards to the philosophical traditions of Islam."[14] The most effusive praise, however, is offered by the Pakistani-American scholar of Islam, Riffat Hassan (b. 1943), who claims that, in her judgement, Iqbāl "is the most outstanding poet-philosopher of the world of Islam, and probably of the world in general, since the death of his *murshid* (spiritual guide) Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi (b. 1207) in 1273" CE.[15]

The problematic aspects of Iqbāl scholarship not only include mischaracterizations or exaggerations about his legacy, but also extend to treatments of specific topics associated with Iqbāl's intellectual and philosophical project. Chief among these is Iqbāl's signature concept of the self (*khūdī*), which appears as a major concept throughout his writings. On that point, Riffat Hassan presents Iqbāl's concept of *khūdī* as his single greatest intellectual contribution,[16] while acknowledging that it was nonetheless developed as a response to a particular cultural and colonial context in which the most urgent questions confronting Indian Muslims involved political identity.[17] In spite of this historical contingency, Hassan argues that Iqbāl's notion of the self is closely associated with a Qur'ānic conception of humanity that presents human beings as the greatest of God's creations. Accordingly, human beings are capable of moral and ontological extremes, and can serve, on the one hand, as God's vicegerent (*khalīfa*) on earth, or, on the other, can sink to the "lowest of the low."[18] In Hassan's estimation, Iqbāl understands *khūdī* as a quality strengthened and weakened by the cultivation of positive and negative character traits, respectively.[19] The shortcomings of

this interpretation will be discussed in further detail below. Before doing so, it is important to mention two other problematic treatments of Iqbāl's notion of selfhood in contemporary scholarship. In his study of *khūdī* entitled "The Human Person in Iqbāl's Thought," Ebrahim Moosa recasts this concept in terms of personhood, inexplicably asserting that Iqbāl's concept of *khūdī* would today be discussed under the rubric of personhood, the human person, or the human condition.[20] Consisting mainly of declarative rather than constructive statements, Moosa's work reinterprets *khūdī* in light of various extraneous categories and philosophic approaches, such as that of the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski (d. 2009), by means of which Moosa characterizes *khūdī* as a non-empirical unconditioned reality.[21] More importantly, Moosa argues that human agency in Iqbāl's work assumes the form of a historical superhuman, which Moosa problematically identifies with the Sufi concept of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*). In Moosa's interpretation of Iqbāl's philosophy, the perfect human being relies on intuition, which is the essence of both instinct and reason. Making use of postmodern categories, Moosa reinterprets Iqbāl's concept of the perfect human as one whose intuition grants them the capacity for forms of transgressive behavior and thought that challenge established norms. These transgressions in turn pave the way to both realize human potential and to make the human being compatible in relation to traditional norms.[22]

In addition to Hassan and Moosa, Sulaymane Diagne offers a study of *khūdī* that is particularly useful for elucidating the influence of Henri Bergson on Iqbāl, as they both consider Humean and Kantian responses to the question of how the mind unifies the various sensory impressions that appear to consciousness. For Bergson and Iqbāl, this is a false problem, since it starts with what they refer to as the datum: a quantitative multiplicity of states external to one another. Instead, both Bergson and Iqbāl argue that the self is known "intuitively" when the individual reaches beyond the "datum," before the fragmentation of multiplicity, and places themselves in relation to the self.[23] In his account, however, Diagne does not note the influence of the Sufi metaphysician Maḥmūd Shabistarī on Iqbāl, a fact ignored by other modern and contemporary scholars as well. Moreover, according to Diagne, the core of Iqbāl's concept of selfhood is characterized by a "unity of life" as opposed to a "unity of consciousness." This, however, is incorrect, since Iqbāl upholds the unity of consciousness in his magnum opus *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.[24] Furthermore, in Diagne's view, Iqbāl's conception of the self is faithful to the Qur'ānic view of human nature, which also upholds "immortality through the movement of life."[25] Diagne further claims that Iqbāl's articulation of selfhood is in line with Sufism, since Sufism, in an active sense, refers to the knowledge of the ultimate nature of things, which is "an active, vital process, the end of which is not contemplation but *being*."[26] Nonetheless, Diagne does not offer any textual evidence to support

these open-ended claims, which are primarily based on a Bergsonian reading of both Iqbāl and Sufism.[27]

Overall, the works of scholars such as Hassan, Moosa, and Diagne illustrate the scholarly limitations and shortcomings of the adulatory tendency that is prevalent in one segment of Iqbāl studies. In analyzing Iqbāl's conception of the self, these scholars do not sufficiently situate Iqbāl in relation to his Muslim predecessors, and hence it is difficult to separate their normative claims from the factual ones based on historical and literary evidence. Characterizations of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*) as a "superhuman" (Moosa) or an "accomplished human being" (Diagne) are simply not supported by textual sources in the Sufi tradition, and yet are presented as such in support of Iqbāl's philosophy of selfhood (*khūdī*). This is reflective of what is perhaps the most problematic aspect of Iqbāl scholarship, namely its unbridled confidence in Iqbāl's own understanding, mastery, and interpretation of concepts such as the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*), the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), annihilation of the self (*fanāʾ al-nafs*), and *ijtihād* (independent juridical reasoning).

This of course begs the question of whether and to what degree Iqbāl misreads or misconstrues Islamic intellectual traditions in order to advance a particular ideological vision. In the view of the aforementioned scholars, this is not the case. Ebrahim Moosa submits that Iqbāl "was fully aware of how Muslim mystics, philosophers, and the pious in every age forged a notion of the self," as "he frequently referred to [Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammd] al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), [Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad] Rumi, [Immanuel] Kant, [George Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel, and [Friedrich] Nietzsche."[28] This argument is clearly unsatisfying, as it effectively equates name-dropping with deep philosophical and textual knowledge. Despite shortcomings of this approach within the context of critical academic scholarship, this view of Iqbāl's work has gained currency in nativist scholarship, in which Iqbāl's authority on the Islamic tradition is accepted uncritically. This phenomenon is particularly acute among works on Iqbāl published in South Asia. Especially troubling is the fact that both Western and indigenous scholars of Iqbāl rarely attempt to assess his thought vis-à-vis the preceding Islamic intellectual tradition, with which Iqbāl was purportedly familiar. This is all the more important in light of Iqbāl's characteristically sweeping remarks on various aspects of Islamic intellectual thought, which will be discussed in greater detail below. Contrary to large segments of both popular and academic opinion on Iqbāl's work, his oeuvre features many instances in which premodern Islamic metaphysical concepts are misconstrued or misrepresented in such a way as to conform to contemporary Western ideas and philosophies. In other words, whereas Iqbāl is held up by his proponents as a unique modernizer and reviver of the Islamic tradition, by interpreting it through the lens of Western philosophy he in fact failed to treat the

Islamic intellectual tradition on its own terms. Ironically, Iqbāl himself admitted as much, writing that most of his "life has been spent in the study of European philosophy and that viewpoint has become [his] second nature," both in his own work and in his analysis of the Islamic tradition.[29] As will be demonstrated below, Iqbāl's acknowledgment that a Eurocentric viewpoint became second nature to him is also revealed by a close reading of his published works, which contain many specific examples confirming his own Eurocentric mentality. Crucially, such a statement by the author himself demonstrates the need for an overall reassessment of Iqbāl's thought vis-à-vis the Islamic intellectual tradition to which he belongs.

Before doing so, it is important to emphasize that this article does not attempt to discredit all of Iqbāl's intellectual achievements or dismiss them out of hand. Rather, it intends to critically assess his ideas within the broader context of Islamic intellectual history, in order to better understand and evaluate Iqbāl's place in relation to his Muslim predecessors. By situating Iqbāl within a broader historical context, scholars can in turn critically reassess his self-consciously reformist project of reconstructing Islamic thought and his theory of the self in particular, which is one of the core elements of that project. To that end, this article does not focus on the many positive aspects and contributions of Iqbāl's philosophy, about which there is no shortage of secondary literature. One should therefore not take away from this article the impression that Iqbāl was categorically incorrect in every claim he made concerning the Islamic tradition or his Muslim predecessors. Rather, the intention of this article is to offer a balanced assessment of an influential thinker and a corrective to certain excesses in the field.

Iqbāl and the Islamic Tradition I: Sufism and Islamic Philosophy

As mentioned above, Iqbāl scholars frequently take for granted his knowledge of the classical Islamic intellectual tradition. When his famous work *The Secrets of the Self* (*Asrār-i Khūdī*) was translated into English in 1920, it received mixed reception both in India and abroad. Critics of the *Asrār* accused Iqbāl of adopting Friedrich Nietzsche's (d. 1900) theory of the superhuman (*Übermensch*) to express his concept of human perfection.[30] In a letter to Reynold Nicholson, Iqbāl rejected these suggestions, instead claiming that "the philosophy of the *Asrār* is a direct development out of the experience and speculation of old Muslim Sufis and thinkers."[31] Despite his objections, substantiation of Iqbāl's claim is elusive. On the contrary, this article argues that Iqbāl in fact never mastered the requisite philological and philosophical skills to critically engage with prior Islamic intellectual traditions, including philosophy (*falsafa*), theology (*kalām*), and philosophical mysticism (*ʿirfān*). This can be observed in his own works which

exhibit controversial, if not outright dubious, interpretations of the Islamic intellectual tradition. One such work is Iqbāl's 1900 treatise "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī," which presents a classic example of a colonial-era Muslim inferiority complex in the face of European Orientalism.[32] This is apparent even from the very beginning, where Iqbāl concedes the inferiority of Muslim scholarship by admitting "the superiority of the Hindu in point of philosophical acumen," despite his refusal to deny or "ignore the intellectual independence of Muslim thinkers."[33] Following this stunning admission, Iqbāl attempts to justify what he considers to be Islam's failure to produce great Muslim Indian philosophers the likes of Kapila (fl. ca. 6th-cen. BCE) and Shankara (d. ca. 750 CE) by arguing that Arab history in the Islamic period "was a long series of glorious military exploits" that left little opportunity for scientific or philosophical pursuits.[34] He additionally blames the purported intellectual shortcomings of Islam on "the unscientific condition of the age [that] led them to write in the spirit of expositors rather than that of independent thinkers."[35] Needless to say, Iqbāl's characterization of Arabo-Islamic history is not at all historically accurate, despite being consistent with a broader theme in his works, namely a tendency toward an uninformed and even biased reading of the history of Islamic philosophy that is particularly lacking in its awareness of the post-Avicennan phase of Islamic philosophical and intellectual history.[36]

Iqbāl's problematic historical perspective also has consequences for his interpretation of ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī's text itself. In his work on *Al-Insān al-Kāmil fī Maʿrifat al-Awākhir w'al-Awāʾil (The Perfect Human Concerning Knowledge of the End and the Beginning)*, Iqbāl begins by explaining the meaning of the word *dhāṭ* (essence) via what appears to be a paraphrase of al-Jīlī himself. There, Iqbāl writes that in al-Jīlī's view "the Essence, pure and simple … is the thing to which names and attributes are given, whether it is existent or non-existent, like an *ʿanqāʾ* (gryphon)."[37] Referring to al-Jīlī, Iqbāl states that the existent has two species: the Existent as Absolute or Pure Existence, i.e., Pure Being or God, versus the Existent joined with non-existence, i.e., creation or nature. On consulting al-Jīlī's original work, however, it becomes clear that Iqbāl's account is marred by several errors. In the original text, al-Jīlī explains existence (*wujūd*) and essence (*dhāṭ*) accordingly:

> Know that the Absolute Essence (*muṭlaq al-dhāṭ*) is an entity to which is ascribed names and attributes (*al-asmāʾ w'al-ṣifāt*) which are identical to the Essence as opposed to Its existence (*wujūd*). So, anything to which names and attributes are ascribed is called an essence (*dhāṭ*), regardless of whether that essence is existent or non-existent like a gryphon (*ʿanqāʾ*). And the existent can be of two kinds: (1) the Pure Existent (*mawjūd maḥḍ*), which is the Essence of Divinity (*dhāṭ al-bārī*), the transcendent, and (2) the

> existent, which is contaminated with non-existence, which is the essence of created things (*dhāṭ al-makhlūqāt*).[38]

Comparing this excerpt against Iqbāl's interpretation of it, it is clear that Iqbāl conflates the concept of the Divine Essence (*muṭlaq al-dhāṭ/dhāṭ al-bārī*) with the more general concept of essence, which al-Jīlī considers like a substance, because names and properties can be attributed to it. Iqbāl then goes on to assert that for al-Jīlī, "the Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can express it, for it is beyond all relation, and knowledge is relation."[39] This is a gross oversimplification of al-Jīlī's position. While a full elaboration of al-Jīlī's concept of the perfect human is beyond the scope of this article, a few points are worth considering in order to highlight the differences between his concept and Iqbāl's interpretation of the same.[40] First, it is important to recognize that al-Jīlī never uses the term "Pure Thought." This is instead a Hegelian notion that is foreign to his own work and intellectual background. Second, al-Jīlī's original text seems to affirm that the Divine Essence cannot be perceived in the manner of ordinary objects, which depends on a relationship between a perceiving subject (*mudrik*) and a perceived object (*mudrak*). This does not, however, imply that the Essence is absolutely unknowable, as Iqbāl suggests. In the sixtieth chapter of his work *Al-Insān al-Kāmil fī Maʿrifat al-Awākhir w'al-Awāʾil* (The Perfect Human Being Concerning Knowledge of the End and the Beginning), al-Jīlī affirms that the perfect human does indeed possess knowledge of the Divine Essence.[41] In any event, rather than reading the text carefully and interpreting it on its own terms, Iqbāl opts instead to read al-Jīlī in light of the philosophy of the German idealist George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (d. 1831). One such example of this method of reading al-Jīlī is as follows:

> In order to understand this passage [of al-Jīlī], we should bear in mind the three stages of development of Pure Being, enumerated by the author in his chapter on the Illumination [*tajallī*] of the Essence. There he propounds that the Absolute Existence or Pure Being, when it leaves its absoluteness, undergoes three stages: (1) Oneness, (2) He-ness, and (3) I-ness. In the first stage there is absence of all attributes and relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free from all manifestation, while the third stage I-ness is nothing but an external manifestation of the He-ness or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name Allah; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious.[42]

Several translation errors can be noted in this text which are indicative of Iqbāl's idiosyncratic way of reading al-Jīlī. First, the word *tajallī*, a fundamental concept in Sufism, is incorrectly translated as "illumination," thereby denuding it of its original conceptual significance. A more accurate translation would

be the "manifestation" or "self-disclosure" of God, which is the common translation in contemporary scholarship.[43] Similarly, the term *majlā* (the place of self-disclosure) is incorrectly translated as "stage," thereby giving it a Hegelian inflection foreign to al-Jīlī's own works and intellectual background. Similarly, important Arabic terms such as *aḥadīyya, huwīyya*, and *annīyya* are erroneously translated as "oneness," "he-ness," and "I-ness."[44] These are in addition to the interpolation of certain terms that have no basis in the text, such as "self-diremption" and the "darkness of Pure Being." Furthermore, Iqbāl uses the term "god-man" to describe the perfect human, which is a misreading of the Sufi concept of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*) in light of Christian theology.[45]

These translation errors and interpretative choices are questionable in themselves, but what is more problematic, however, is Iqbāl's use of these readings and misreadings of al-Jīlī's text to make historical claims about al-Jīlī's Sufi thought itself, such as his conclusion near the end of the text that al-Jīlī's understanding of *al-insān al-kāmil* "has anticipated many of the chief doctrines of modern German philosophy and particularly Hegelianism," despite the fact that al-Jīlī is "not a systematic thinker at all," and as such lacks "sound philosophical method … positive proofs for his position … [and] systematic unity."[46] Thus, Iqbāl characterizes al-Jīlī's work on the perfect human as "a confused jumble of metaphysics, religion, mysticism and ethics, very often excluding all likelihood of analysis."[47] One possible defense of this problematic and plainly Eurocentric reading of al-Jīlī would be to characterize it as mere juvenilia.[48] This is not the case, however, as similar mistranslations and mischaracterizations appear throughout more than three decades of Iqbāl's published work, including his late work *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (1930).

Iqbāl's tendency toward a Eurocentric interpretation of premodern Islamic intellectual traditions is not unintentional or incidental. Instead, it is often a conscious scholarly choice on his part. This can be illustrated in his short treatise "Bedil in the Light of Bergson," (1916) in which Iqbāl interprets the works of ʿAbd al-Qādir Bīdil (d. 1720) by means of the philosophy of his contemporary, Henri Bergson (d. 1941), which afforded Iqbāl the opportunity to challenge Sufi metaphysics and attack some of its central doctrines.[49] Regarding the important concept of *fanāʾ* (annihilation), Iqbāl erroneously claims that "the word means self-negation or absorption in the Universal self of God." Throughout his writings Iqbāl argues against such a conception of *fanāʾ*, understood as "self-negation," which he equates with "inaction" and uses as a foil to advance his theory of the self, which is characterized by "dynamism," "life" and "activity."[50] Iqbāl's reading of the term is misguided, however, insofar as the concept of *fanāʾ* it does not in fact indicate the loss of one's individual attributes or selfhood. In fact, in contrast to Iqbāl's characterization of the term, words such as negation or absorption are hardly found in Sufi discussions of *fanāʾ*.

This misreading of a key term of Sufi metaphysics undermines the sweeping critiques that Iqbāl levels at the Sufi tradition. Instead of availing himself of careful consideration of the source-texts, Iqbāl makes broad and dismissive claims such as "the idea of annihilation [*fanāʾ*] is indeed the vice of all Persian Sufism … which has, for centuries been prevalent in the entire Muslim world, and working as one of the principal factors of its decay."[51] According to Iqbāl, Persian Sufism has "soaked up the energies of the best Muslims in every age, and has imperceptibly undermined the foundations of a revelational system of law which it regards as a mere device to meet the emergencies of communal life."[52] Iqbāl additionally identifies pantheism as the chief characteristic of Persian Sufism, while failing to recognize that the greatest of exponent of this "supposed pantheism," Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī, was not in fact a Persian, but an Arab. Ironically, some of the Sufis that Iqbāl himself admired, namely Bīdil and Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī (d. 1762), were themselves followers of Ibn ʿArabī, whom they themselves did not consider to be a pantheist. The question of pantheism in Ibn ʿArabī's work is beyond the scope of this article, but, as recent scholarship has demonstrated, this accusation by both Islamic and Orientalist scholars is largely unfounded.[53] Moreover, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence that Iqbāl directly engaged with Ibn ʿArabī's major works, such as *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyya* (The Meccan Openings) or the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (The Bezels of Wisdom). Therefore, Iqbāl once again bases his argument against Sufism's abstruse metaphysical doctrines not on a careful reading of the primary texts themselves, but instead on "vulgar beliefs"[54] regarding the Sufi tradition. The consequences of this for Iqbāl's ability to adequately interpret Sufi metaphysics are significant, as demonstrated in the following example of his attempted interpretation of Bīdil:

> "In the ocean of the Absolute Being," says the poet, "mountains and deserts form one continuous flow, it is our thirsty understanding, that builds mirages in it." The thirsty alone are subject to the optical illusion of a mirage, since the presence of a crying practical interest i.e., satisfaction of the desire for drink, determines the character of their perception and makes the dry desert sand assume the appearance of a sheet of water. I think, however, that Bedil [sic] has failed properly to express the idea that the form and quality of our knowledge is determined by the practical interests of life.[55]

Being unfamiliar with Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics, Iqbāl provides a naïve and literal interpretation of this verse. Had he been more familiar with Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics, Iqbāl would have recognized Bīdil's allusion to Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysical concept of the universe as divine imagination, as a result of which the human imagination or human life is conceived as imagination within imagination or a "dream within a dream."[56] For this reason, the human mind's construction of reality is nothing more than a mirage, whereas the absolute reality of God transcends such categories. Without an awareness of the broader

conceptual and intertextual context of this work, Iqbāl can only offer a literal reading that misses the point of Bīdil's text. In the last part of the treatise, Iqbāl attacks the Sufi doctrine of God's self-disclosure (*tajallī*) and descent (*tanazzul*). In Iqbāl's view, such a doctrine of descent degrades God and reverts to the old hypothesis of the followers of the Iranian prophet-philosopher Mani (d. ca. 277 CE), who held that the creation of the world was due to Absolute Light obscuring or darkening a portion of itself. Iqbāl then rhetorically asks the Sufis: "Why should God obscure His own light or descend into matter? To manifest His power and glory? Self-manifestation by self-degradation! Strange way of looking at Him whom the Sufis are never tired of calling the Beloved! . . . Ethically speaking the Sufi view of 'Descent' may serve as a basis for Epicureanism as well as Asceticism."[57]

Iqbāl's penchant for misreading and misconstruing premodern Islamic texts is not limited to philosophy and metaphysics.[58] Repeatedly, Iqbāl attempts to read Islamic intellectual traditions in light of the latest scientific theories, such as evolution or relativity. For example, Iqbāl identifies a theory of evolution in the Persian philosopher and Būyid vizier Abū 'Alī Aḥmad Ibn Miskawayh's (d. 1030 CE)[59] discussion of various stages of mineral, vegetal, animal, and human life. According to Ibn Miskawayh, the lowest stage of plant life does not require seeds for its generation and growth. This kind of plant life differs from minerals only in its limited capacity for movement, which is Ibn Miskawayh's term for plants' capacity to grow and develop into higher and more complicated forms of vegetation, which require seeds for the perpetuation of their species. Supported by good soil and climate, Ibn Miskawayh identifies the highest stages of plant life with vines and date palms, which he considers to be on the threshold of animal life, which he then associates with the emergence of a sense of touch. This is followed next by the sense of sight, and the remaining senses thereafter. In Ibn Miskawayh's system, animal life reaches its perfection in the horse and the falcon, as well as in apes, which he considers to be just a degree below the human being.

In his reading of Ibn Miskawayh, Iqbāl ignores the fact that the text does not include certain key elements of Darwinian evolution, namely any concept analogous to the mechanism of "natural selection," which is contingent upon several factors, such as variation in traits, differential reproduction, and heredity.[60] In the absence of these scientific explanatory mechanisms, merely speaking about the development of species or classifying the natural world does not establish Ibn Miskawayh's work as a theory of evolution *avant la lettre*. Moreover, Iqbāl's exposition of Ibn Miskawayh includes the addendum that "further evolution brings physiological changes with a growing power of discrimination and spirituality until humanity passes from barbarism to civilization,"[61] a sentiment which is not present in the text itself but instead reflects Iqbāl's own evolutionary reading of history. Consequently, two possible conclusions can

be drawn from this. Either Iqbāl did not adequately understand evolutionary theory, and instead based his own knowledge on so-called "vulgar beliefs,"[62] or he opted to ignore the differences between Ibn Miskawayh's work and modern theories of evolution in order to draw superficial associations between that text and current scientific trends.

Iqbāl's fascination with modern science is further illustrated by his attempt to rethink the concept of the self in light of the theory of relativity in modern theoretical physics. This is best shown by his article "Self in the Light of Relativity," (1925) which draws on popular notions of Albert Einstein's (d. 1955) theory of relativity to claim that Einstein's mathematical view of the universe completes a process of purification started by David Hume (d. 1776 CE), and true to the spirit of Hume's criticism, banishes the concept of force altogether.[63] Moreover, according to Iqbāl, although physicists generally ignore metaphysics, Einstein's theory compels them to accept the fact that the knower is intimately related to the known object, and thus that the act of knowing is itself a constitutive element of objective reality.[64] In other words, Iqbāl interprets the implications of the theory of relativity to mean that scientific realism, i.e., the view that the world exists on its own independent of human experience, must be refined or rejected. This is rather a surprising claim, one which would be hard to accept from Einstein's own viewpoint, given that Einstein himself was a scientific realist who considered scientific realism as an axiomatic necessity when performing experiments.[65] Ironically, Iqbāl's comments about relativity confirm the famous double-slit experiment in quantum mechanics and its implications regarding the intertwining relationship between the observer and the observed, which vexed Einstein until the very end of his life.

Regardless of these conceptual incongruities and oversights, Iqbāl's enthusiasm for the theory of relativity did not stop him from asserting that, in light of this modern theory, there must be some self for whom the world ceases to exist as an Other, given the fundamental relativity of the universe itself. He therefore interprets the theory of relativity to imply that the self must be non-spatial, non-temporal, and Absolute, to which nothing is perceived as external. In Iqbāl's view, such a conclusion is necessary, given that without such an assumption objective reality cannot be relative to the spatial and temporal self. He goes on to suggest that the universe is not an Other for the Absolute, i.e., the Divine Self, but is instead only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite existence. Iqbāl then offers a religious interpretation of Einstein's statement that "the universe is finite but boundless" by arguing that the universe's finitude refers to it being a passing phase of God's extensively infinite consciousness, whereas its boundlessness demonstrates the intensively infinite creative power of God.[66] Iqbāl follows this by rhetorically asking if "the human self [is] also a phase of God's consciousness, or something more

substantial than a mere idea. The nature of the self is such that it is self-centered and exclusive. Are, then, the Absolute Self and the human self related to each other that they mutually exclude each other?"[67] In response, Iqbāl claims that realization of the self does not occur by passively observing the impressions that external reality casts on one's mind. Rather, the self recognizes itself as one of the greatest energies of nature by molding these stimuli and by acting in such a way that enables it to unite with God without losing its own identity. Thus, through activity the self is conjoined to God's consciousness.[68]

Iqbāl expands this rather "mystical" interpretation of the theory of relativity by drawing on a variety of materials from the Islamic tradition, such as certain verses of the Qur'ān and the works of Sufi thinkers such as Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī (d. 1289 CE) and Muḥammad Pārsā (d. 1460 CE), and putting forth the dubious assertion that their religious psychology can bring Muslims nearer to modern ways of looking at the problem of space and time. In Iqbāl's opinion, certain verses of the Qur'ān also refer to the existence of some kind of space in relation to God.[69] To that end, he enumerates three kinds of space that he identifies in the sacred text, namely the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God.[70] As with time and space, Iqbāl touches on theories of motion in Islamic theology and attempts to demonstrate how they anticipate modern quantum mechanical understandings of motion, as in Max Planck's (d. 1947) concept of energy quanta.[71]

Needless to say, like his treatment of evolution in the work of Ibn Miskawayh, Iqbāl's interpretations of the theory of relativity are based on a rather simplistic and popular interpretation of Einstein's theory. This is suggested most strongly by the fact that Iqbāl makes no mention of the distinction between the theories of general and special relativity, the former being of greater significance to his own writings on the topic. Additionally, Iqbāl does not demonstrate competence in any of the mathematical or scientific concepts that underpin general relativity, such as differential geometry, tensor calculus, or the concept of space as a Riemannian "manifold,"[72] which rejects the understanding of space as being globally flat, as in Euclidean geometry. Consequently, Iqbāl mistakenly construes a link between the theory of relativity, which has no account of consciousness, and his own concept of the self, which is a self-conscious entity.[73] Iqbāl's apparent disinterest in rigorous engagement with the mathematical bases of theoretical physics again suggests that his engagement with this field of modern science served two interrelated purposes for his own work. First, it provided him conceptual tools that could be instrumentally applied to advance his own philosophy and concept of the self (*khūdī*). Second, a superficial treatment of theoretical physics that ignores its mathematical complexities allowed Iqbāl to draw appealing connections between modern science and intellectual figures in the premodern Islamic intellectual tradition.

In summary, Iqbāl's effort to read the Islamic tradition in light of modern philosophical and scientific trends can be seen as an attempt to reassert Muslim self-confidence in the face of epistemic colonialism. Ironically, instead of challenging the epistemic architecture of Eurocentrism or colonialism, Iqbāl's methodology tacitly acquiesces to its conceptual presumptions insofar as attempts to show that the Islamic intellectual tradition is significant not for its own achievements, but as a precursor to the rise of modern science.[74] While one may be tempted to characterize this kind of thinking as reflective of a sort of colonial inferiority complex, Iqbāl nonetheless goes to great lengths to criticize European culture. In many of his poems, he urges fellow Muslims not to be seduced by Western culture and its pomp. For example, in the *Jāwīd-nāma* (The Book of Eternity), Iqbāl writes:[75]

> Imitation of the West seduces the East from itself (*sharq rā az khūd burd taqlīd-i gharb*);
> these people have need to criticize the West.
> The power of the West (*quwwat-i maghrib*) comes not from lute and rebec,
> not from the dancing of unveiled girls (*raqṣ-i dukhtarān-i bī-ḥijāb*),
> not from the magic of tulip-cheeked enchantresses (*lālah-rūst*),
> not from naked legs (*ʿuryān-i sāq*) and bobbed hair (*qaṭʿ-i mū*);
> its strength springs not from irreligion (*lā-dīnī*),
> its glory derives not from the Latin script.
> The power of the West comes from science and technology (*ʿilm u fann*),
> and with that selfsame flame its lamp is bright.
> Wisdom (*ḥikmat*) derives not from the cut and trim of clothes (*jāma*);
> the turban is no impediment to science and technology.
> For science and technology (*ʿilm u fann*), elegant young sprig,
> brains are necessary, not European clothes (*malbūs-i farhang*);
> on this road only keen sight is required,
> what is needed is not this or that kind of hat.
> If you have a nimble intellect, that is sufficient;
> if you have a perceptive nature (*ṭabʿ-i darākī*), that is sufficient.[76]

This was not an isolated passage in Iqbāl's poetry. Rather, there are several instances where he castigated European culture, despite his acknowledged debt to such European thinkers as Hegel, Nietzsche, Goethe, and Wordsworth.[77] In the *Jāwīd-nāma*, he decries the deceptive allure of the West and Western culture:

> Do you know what European culture is (*chīst farhang-i tahdhīb*)?
> In its world are two hundred paradises of color (*ṣad firdaws rang*);
> its dazzling shows have burned down abodes,
> consumed with fire branch, leaf and nest.
> Its exterior is shining and captivating
> but its heart is weak (*dil ḍaʿīf ast*), a slave to the gaze;
> the eye beholds, the heart staggers within
> and falls headlong before this idol-temple (*but-khāna*).[78]

He also characterizes European culture as hedonistic and vain, writing: "The desire of the Europeans (*farhang*) is to make / Perpetual feast out of the world / Oh a vain desire, Oh a vain desire (*tamannā-yi khām*)!"[79] Given all this, one may argue that Iqbāl admired the West's scientific prowess while rejecting other facets of its culture. One can therefore read his ruminations on time and space and the theory of evolution as an attempt to show to Muslims how one might reconstruct the Islamic worldview in light of modern science.

Iqbāl and the Islamic Tradition II: Selfhood (*Khūdī*) and Annihilation (*Fanā'*)

The previous section of this article examined Iqbāl's penchant for interpreting premodern Islamic thought in light of various modern philosophies and scientific theories. This section turns instead to Iqbāl's reading of specific concepts in classical Islamic thought, and attempts provides further evidence of Iqbāl's mischaracterization of classical Islamic concepts and doctrines. It focuses on two major interrelated concepts that feature prominently in Iqbāl's writings, namely the concept of "selfhood" (*khūdī*) and attendant concepts such as mind-body dualism, and the Sufi concept of annihilation of the self (*fanā' al-nafs*).

As mentioned earlier, the notion of the self plays a central role throughout Iqbāl's philosophy. As such, he engages with thinkers from both Islamic and Western traditions in his attempt to articulate his own, idiosyncratic conception of the self. In this regard, his later work *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is a key text, in which Iqbāl summarily discusses the development of the self in various schools of Islamic thought, including theology (*kalām*) and philosophy (*falsafa*). This account is, however, somewhat uneven. For example, he considers Muslim theologians' discussions of the self to be unsatisfactory. In his view, Islamic theology relegates the soul to "a finer kind of matter or a mere accident which dies with the body and is re-created on the Day of Judgement."[80] In this regard, Iqbāl notes the influence of pre-Islamic religious traditions that were active in the premodern Islamic world and which had an influence on Islamic theology and conceptions of the soul. He observes how "the expansion of Islam brought within its fold peoples belonging to different creed-communities, such as Nestorians, Jews, Zoroastrians, whose intellectual outlook had been formed by the concepts of a culture which is … on the whole Magian in its origin and development."[81] In Iqbāl's estimation, this "Magian" culture is centered on a "dualistic soul-picture which we find more or less reflected in the theological thought of Islam."[82] Iqbāl contrasts this with "the philosophers of Islam [who] received inspiration from Greek thought."[83] Additionally, Iqbāl further claims incorrectly that in the case of Islamic theology, "of which [Abū Ḥāmid] al-Ghazālī is the chief exponent, the ego is a simple, indivisible, and

immutable soul-substance, entirely different from the group of our mental states and unaffected by the passage of time," and that "the interest of this school … was not so much psychological as metaphysical."[84] He justifies this critique with reference to Immanuel Kant's (d. 1804) paralogisms of pure reason in order to downplay the soul's substantiality and indivisibility. One of the primary shortcomings of Iqbāl's simplistic rendering of the development of the concept of the self in Islamic theology is that it ignores a holistic, hylomorphic tendency in Islamic theology, discernible from eleventh and twelfth centuries CE onward, that challenged the physicalist foundations of *kalām* ontology. This was due to the influence of Islamic philosophers' concept of an immaterial self, a concept supported by notable theologians, including Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE), who explicitly accepts this concept while not completely abandoning the prevalent theological view of the self as a subtle body, which he accepts for purposes of articulating the body-soul relationship. This is on full display in his *Eastern Studies in Metaphysics and Physics* (*al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyya fī ʿilm al-Ilāhīyyāt w'al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt*), where al-Rāzī asserts the immateriality of the self by reasoning that anyone who apprehends a thing possesses its quiddity, and since individual human beings apprehend their selves, which are directly present to them as individuals, human beings indeed possess a self.[85]

It is important to note that, unlike the *kalām* physicalist view, al-Rāzī's account begins from the point of self-awareness and self-intellection, a mode of argumentation that had by his time a long-standing history in the philosophies of both Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā, aka Avicenna (d. 1037 CE), and Shahāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191 CE). Later influential theologians such as ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 1365 CE), Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390 CE) and al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 1414 CE) incorporated similar insights from the *falsafa* tradition while at the same time attempting to chart a middle course between the materialist and immaterialist conception of the self.[86] Similarly, Islamic philosophers presented a complex multidimensional view of the self that incorporates into it modalities of consciousness, first-person subjectivity, and emotions. For example, Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1640 CE) argued that consciousness, in its most primitive form, is the defining feature of human subjectivity, without which it would be impossible to account for any mental actions. He argues that this is because any phenomenal states that the self ascribes to itself already presuppose an underlying consciousness. For this reason, Ṣadrā asserts that even instinctive actions, such as quickly withdrawing from something perceived as too hot or too cold, bear witness to an underlying awareness of the self. By extension, Mullā Ṣadrā therefore asserts that it would be mistaken to argue for the existence of the self on the basis of general actions such as thinking, believing, or doubting, because these are not self-subsisting phenomena, but instead presuppose an underlying subject to which they occur.[87]

While either unaware or unwilling to engage with the longstanding theological and philosophical discourse on the self in the Islamic tradition, Iqbāl anachronistically asserts that it ascribed to a form of Cartesian dualism, which he subsequently rejects.[88] In his view, mind and body become one in action. "When I take up a book from my table," Iqbāl reasons, "my act is single and indivisible. It is impossible to draw a line of cleavage between the share of the body and that of the mind in this act. Somehow, they must belong to the same system … The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts," which nonetheless does not negate the distinction between soul and body.[89] According to Iqbāl, the ego is characterized by its spontaneity, whereas the body is constituted in accumulated action or a habit of the soul.[90] The body, Iqbāl claims, is inseparable from the soul because it is a permanent element of consciousness, which appears from the outside as something stable.[91] In his poetry as well, Iqbāl returns to the issue of mind-body dualism, and expands on his position described above:

> You who say that the body is the soul's vehicle (*maḥmal-i jān ast tan*),
> consider the soul's secret (*sirr-i jān*); tangle not with the body.
> It (i.e., the body) is not a vehicle (*maḥmal*), it is a state of the soul;
> to call it its vehicle is a confusion of terms.
> What is the soul (*jān*)? Rapture, joy, burning and anguish,
> delight in mastering the revolving sphere.
> What is the body (*tan*)? Habit of color and scent (*bā rang u bū khū kardan ast*),
> habit of dwelling in the world's dimensions …
> This body is not the associate of the soul (*īn badan bā jān-i mā anbāz nīst*);
> a handful of earth is no impediment to flight.'[92]

Elsewhere in the *Jawīd-nama*, Iqbāl writes:

> I will tell you a subtle mystery, my son:
> the body is all clay (*tan hama khāk ast*), the soul (*jān*) a precious pearl.
> The body (*jism*) must be melted for the sake of the soul (*jān*),
> the pure must be distinguished from the clay.
> If you cut off a part of the body from the body (*tan az tan*),
> that slice of the body will be lost to you;
> but the soul which is drunk with vision –
> if you give it away, it will return to you.
> The soul's substance (*jawhar*) resembles nothing else;
> it is in bonds, and yet not in bonds;
> if you watch over it, it dies in the body,
> and if you scatter it, it illuminates the gathering.
> What, noble sir (*mard-i rād*), is the soul "drunk with vision?" (*jān jilwah-yi mast*)
> What does it mean to "give the soul away?"
> To give away the soul is to surrender it to God, (*bih ḥaqq pardākhtan*)
> it means melting the mountain with the soul's flame (*sūz-i jān*).

> "Drunk with vision" means discovering one's self (*khwīshtan rā daryāftan*),
> shining like a star in the night-season:
> not to discover one's self is not to exist (*khwīsh rā nā-yāftan, nābūdan ast*),
> to discover is to bestow the self on the self (*khūd rā bih khūd bakhshūdan ast*).[93]

It is important to note that Iqbāl's philosophy of the self, as expressed in these verses of the *Jawīd-nama*, among others, marks a significant departure from classical Muslim thought, even though he claimed to have derived its ingredients from classical Sufism. Moreover, although both Iqbāl and preceding Muslim philosophers analyze the self from a first-person perspective, Iqbāl's account of the self's moral development and its progress toward human perfection remains as a point of difference between them.[94] This may be due to the strong influence of Friedrich Nietzsche on Iqbāl's concept of the self, which was raised by his critics shortly after the publication of his work on this topic, the *Secrets of the Self* (*Asrār-i Khūdī*), despite Iqbāl's vehement denials.[95]

Turning now to Iqbāl's interpretation of the Sufi concept of annihilation of the self (*fanāʾ*), it is clear once again, that his understanding does differ noticeably from the way that the concept was articulated in the classical Islamic tradition. This can best be illustrated by examining Iqbāl's understudied commentary on Maḥmūd Shabistarī's *Gulshan-i Rāz* (The Rose Garden of Mysteries). Among Sufi metaphysicians, Shabistarī stands out for his extensive treatment of the self and human subjectivity, concerning which his famous work *Gulshan-i Rāz* contains ample meditations on self-inquiry and the reality of human nature. At the beginning of his commentary, entitled *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd* (The New Rose Garden of Secrets), Iqbāl himself explains his reasons for composing a commentary on Shabistarī's work:

> I am delineating my thought in a different style,
> while responding to the book of Maḥmūd [Shabistarī].
> Since the days of the Shaikh (Shabistarī) until our own time,
> No man has given the sparks of fire to our life.[96]

Among this treatise's series of inquiries pertaining to the nature of reality and self-realization, Shabistarī devotes one chapter in particular to the question of what the term "I" truly means. Directly addressing the question "who am I," Shabistarī writes: "Who am I? Inform me what the 'I' means (*kih bāsham man, marā az man khabar kun*). / What is the meaning of "travel into yourself?"[97] In his commentary, Iqbāl responds accordingly:

> The Self (*khūdī*) is the amulet (*taʿwīdh*) for the safeguarding of the universe.
> The first ray of Its essence is life.
> Life emerges from its sweet dream (*khwāb-i khūsh*),
> Its inner core which is one becomes many (*darūnash chūn yakī bisyār gardad*) …

Its inner core is a shoreless sea,
The heart of every drop is a turbulent wave.
which has no desire to be patient.
Its manifestation is through individuals (*afrād*).
Life is fire and selves are like its sparks;
Like stars they are (both) stationary and moving.
Without going outside, it recognizes others;
Whilst in the midst of company, it is in solitude.
Observe its self-entanglement (*bih khūd pīchīdan*),
What develops out of the trodden earth.
It is constantly engaged in an internal conflict with itself,
Its war with itself gives to things a system and a purpose …
The earthly garb is a veil over the self (*khūdī*),
Its appearance is like the rising of the sun.
In the innermost heart of ours is its sun,
Our dust is illuminated through its substance (*jawhar*).[98]

In this passage, Iqbāl presents the Self, identified with God, as the guardian of the universe. Its inner core, imagined as the unified wholeness of shoreless sea, becomes multiple through its manifestation in many individuals (*afrād*). Life (*ḥayāt*) in Iqbāl's account is the divine Self's first manifestation, and individual selves are distinguished from one another through their participation in it. Moreover, the individual's "earthly garb," i.e., the body, functions as a veil over its true nature. Crucially, the self in Iqbāl's commentary is characterized by psychological turmoil that eventually gives rise to meaning in its existence. This passage continues:

You ask to be informed about the "I,"
and the meaning of "travel into yourself" (*andar khūd safar kun*).
I related to you about the body-soul relationship (*rabṭ-i jān u tan*)
Travel into yourself and see the reality of the "I."
"Travelling into the self" means being born without father and mother,
To conquer the Pleiades from the edge of the roof;
To hold eternity with a single stroke of inconstant breath,
To see without the rays of the sun;
To overcome every sign of hope and fear,
To sunder the sea like Moses,
To break this spell of ocean and land,
To split the moon with a finger.
To return from the placeless place (*lā-makān*),
Which is within one's heart, with the world in his hand.[99]

As mentioned above, Iqbāl maintained a position concerning the body-soul relationship which is opposed to Cartesian dualism, given that in his view the body is constituted through the accumulated actions of the soul. Responding

to Shabistarī's inquiry concerning the meaning of the phrase "travelling into the self," Iqbāl interprets it to mean conquering the universe through scientific knowledge so that one would be able to study the stars from the edge of the roof. It also means overcoming psychological infirmities, such as fear. This contrasts markedly with Shabistarī's original text. For instance, in the *Gulshan-i Rāz*, Shabistarī writes:

> Who am I? Tell me what the "I" means?
> What is the meaning of "travel into yourself" (*andar khūd safar kun*)?
> Again, you question me, saying, "What am I" (*man chīst*)
> Inform me as to what "I" means.
>
> When Absolute Being (*hast-i muṭlaq*) has to be indicated
> They use the word "I" to express it.
> When Reality (*ḥaqīqat*) is conditioned into myriads of phenomena
> You express it by the word "I,"
> "I" and "you" are the accidents of Being (*wujūd*).
> The networks of the niches of the lamp of the Necessary Being.
> Know bodies and spirits (*arwāḥ*) are all the One Light,
> Now shining from mirrors, now from torches.
> You say the word "I" in every connection
> Indicates the soul of man;
> But as you have made theoretical analysis (*khirad*) your guide,
> You do not know your self from one of your parts (*ze juzwi khwīsh khūd ra*),
> Go, O master, and know yourself well (*nīk bi-shinās*),
> But don't mistake swelling for the fullness of health.
> "I" and "you" are higher than body and soul (*jān u tan*),
> For both body and soul are parts of "I."
> The word "I" is not limited to human (*na insān ast makhṣūṣ*),
> So that you should say it means only the soul (*jān*).
> Travel the path that raises you above time and space,
> Leave this world and be yourself a world for yourself…
> When this veil [of identity] is lifted from you
> The laws of religion (*ḥukm-i madhhab*) and its sects will disappear.
> All the rules of the *sharī'a* (*ḥukm-i sharīʿat*) are because of your "I,"
> Since the latter is tied to body and soul (*jān u tan*).
> When this "I" of yours does not remain in between,
> What place have the Ka'ba, synagogue or monastery?[100]

In this passage, Shabistarī emphatically affirms that only Absolute Being can be truly referred to as "I." This raises the question as to how Shabistarī understands the individual's human being's sense of self, their sense of "I"-ness. Rather than identifying the essence of human selfhood with rationality (*nuṭq*), a mind-body complex, or the material composite (*jumla*) of the body with its attendant accidents (*aʿrāḍ*), Shabistarī instead argues that the true essence of the human self coincides

with divine subjectivity. In order to forestall any possible misunderstanding concerning the distinction between God and creation, however, Shabistarī's commentator, the Persian Sufi poet Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad bin Yaḥyā Lāhījī (fl. 16th-cen. CE) explains this poem by stating that when Absolute Being (*wujūd-i muṭlaq*) relativizes Itself by self-determination (*taʿayyun*), divine selfhood becomes conditioned into myriad subjectivities, both human and non-human.[101] Lāhījī then clarifies that neither he nor Shabistarī intend that the conventional self with which people identify is divine. Rather, one finds one's true self in the divine when one transcends the phenomenal self via what the Sufi tradition terms "annihilation" (*fanāʾ*). In Lāhijī's account, this is no simple feat. Rather, he describes how attainment of *fanāʾ* involves embarking on a spiritual journey (*sayr-i maʿnawī*) beyond the spatio-temporal realm (*kawn u makān*), which prepares the individual to transcend the plane of multiplicity and determinations (*katharāt u taʿayyunāt*) and attain the plane of the Absolute (*maqām-i muṭlaq*) through the annihilation of corporeal existence (*fanā-yi jismānī*).[102]

Moreover, in Lāhijiī's account, although other creatures and entities also have their share of divine subjectivity, only humans are capable of reflecting the full possibility of the divine Self. It is therefore not accidental that in subsequent portions of the *Gulshan-i Rāz*, Shabistarī expounds the doctrine of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*),[103] which according to him is the highest mode of selfhood that can be attained by means of a spiritual path. In this sense, the exhortation "travel into yourself" that appears in the poem comes to signify the spiritual journey that one is supposed to undertake in order to realize the "true self" and cast aside one's conventional, empirical self. Apart from their common exhortation to "look inside" in order to discover the self, however, there is no similarity between the accounts of the nature of the human self articulated by Iqbāl and Shabistarī. Unlike Shabistarī and Lāhījī, Iqbāl asserts that the pronouns "I" or "He" bear witness to human immortality. Furthermore, Iqbāl insists that real life consists in having a communal life, while making no reference to the spiritual life or mystical journey. Iqbāl writes:

> What is the reality of "I" and "He?" It is a divine mystery!
> "I" and "He" are a witness to our immortality.
> The hidden and the apparent are illumined by the Divine Self (*dhāt*).
> To live in the midst of a community is real life.[104]

The value that Iqbāl's account of the self places on communal life appears at first glance to be at odds with the spiritual ideal of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*), which is discussed in greater detail in the seventh inquiry of the *Gulshan-i Rāz*. Shabistarī asks: "Of what sort is this traveler, who is the wayfarer? / Of whom shall I say that he is the perfect human (*mard-i tamām*)?"[105] Iqbāl responds:

If you direct your eyes towards your heart,
You will find your destination within your self.
To travel while being present to oneself is
to travel from one's self to one's self (*safar az khūd bih khūd kardan*) …
Don't seek the end of the journey, for there is no end;
If you ever reach the end, you will lose your soul (*jān*) …[106]
Do not allow yourself to be guided by the
faqīh, *shaykh*, and *mullā*,
Like fish, do not walk about carelessly around the hook …[107]
It is not up to us to merge into the ocean of His being.
If you catch hold of Him, it is not annihilation (*fanā'*).
It is impossible for the Divine Self (*khūdī*) to be contained by the self (*khūdī andar khūdī gunjad muḥāl ast*),
The self's perfection is to be itself.[108]

In other words, while Iqbāl agrees that the reality of the self is to be found within, unlike Shabistarī and other Sufis before him, he foresees no finality to the self's journey into itself. Another key difference involves Iqbāl's view that the individual spiritual seeker does not need a spiritual guide to undertake this journey, whether a Sufi master (*shaykh*), a jurist (*faqīh*), or a mullah. The most significant difference, however, involves the fact that in Iqbāl's account, this journey does not end in annihilation of the self, since the human self cannot contain the Divine. This is explained further in the next inquiry, which deals with Manṣūr al-Ḥallāj's famous utterance, "I am the Real" (*anā al-ḥaqq*), which is quoted by Shabistarī, who writes: "What is the significance of the saying, 'I am the Real' (*anā al-ḥaqq*)? / What do you say? Is this a great riddle or mere nonsense?"[109] In his response, Iqbāl writes:

Once again I am going to clarify the mystery of "I am the Real" (*anā al-ḥaqq*),
unfolding a secret before India and Iran.
The Magus said to his disciples in the monastery,
Whoever says the [word] "I" lives in an illusion …[110]
Our existence and appearance are God's imagination.
The station of over and under, including all the dimensions is a dream (*khwāb*).
Rest and motion, desire and search, are all dreams!
Wakeful heart and wise intellect, a dream,
Thought and conjecture, certainty and belief, a dream;
Your wakeful eye (*chashm-i bīdārī*) is nothing other than a dream,
Your speech and action are all but a dream! …[111]
The world of color and smell (*jahān-i rang u bū*) lacks real existence,
Earth and sky, mountain and palace, are not real.
It can be said that all these appear as a veil
Over the countenance of the Indescribable [God].[112]

Although Shabistarī's interpretation of al-Ḥallāj's statement "I am the Real" (*anā al-ḥaqq*) differs substantially from Iqbāl's, these particular couplets just cited express the fundamentally unreal and illusory nature of material existence, which is somewhat surprising, given that they reflect the traditional Sufi doctrine of the unity of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), which is anathema for Iqbāl, as discussed in greater detail above. Continuing through this section of *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, Iqbāl describes the true nature of the self as something that lies beyond the physical world of the senses:

> But the self (*khūdī*) does not belong to the universe of color and smell;
> Our senses do not intervene between us and it.
> Eyesight has no access to its sacred precincts,
> You can perceive the self without eyesight (*kunī khūd rā tamāshā bī-nigāhī*).[113]

While both Iqbāl and Shabistarī consider the self to be immaterial, they differ on their interpretation of al-Ḥallāj's statement. Whereas Shabistarī, like most of the Sufi tradition before him, interpreted "I am the Real" to be indicative of a transcendent spiritual state, Iqbāl instead urges his readers to appropriate it as an affirmation of the human self:

> Do not talk of Shankara and Mansūr [al-Ḥallāj] any longer,
> Find God through finding your own self (*bih rāh-khwīshtan jūy*)
> Be lost in the sea of your self to discover the reality of the Self (*taḥqīq-i khūdī shaw*),
> Say "I am the Real" (*anā al-ḥaqq*) and affirm the Self (*khūdī*).[114]

Iqbāl and Shabistarī agree that the individual cannot become God, nor can God become the individual. They differ, however, in that whereas Iqbāl does not see any contradiction in affirming both "I am" and "I am God," this would be inadmissible for Shabistarī. For him, there is not, nor was there ever, such a separation between God and the self to begin with. Rather, there is only an apparent separation, due to God's self-determination (*ta'ayyun*) into various forms: "Self-determination is the reason why Being appears to be separated / God has not become the servant, nor the servant the Lord."[115]

This difference marks a crucial distinction between Iqbāl, on the one hand, and premodern Sufi thinkers such as Shabistarī, on the other. In contrast to Iqbāl, Sufis such as Shabistarī did not see any contradiction in simultaneously maintaining God's primacy of subjectivity and consciousness alongside the distinct reality of people as created human beings. This is because, according to the Sufi doctrine of the oneness of being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), human beings can only assert their individual subjectivity within the ocean of divine subjectivity, which is both absolute and infinite. In other words, Sufis such as Shabistarī consider individual human beings to have an underlying, true self, which is nothing other than the immanent, divine subjectivity at the core of human

consciousness. For such Sufis, therefore, the mystical experiences of *fanāʾ* and *baqāʾ* involve removing the illusory veil of the ordinary, conventional self that obscures the true self of divine consciousness. This differs from Iqbāl, who does not consider the pinnacle of human subjectivity to be the removal of this illusory consciousness, but instead its "self-affirmation" as such:

> The ideal of Islamic mysticism according to my understanding is not the extinction of the "I." The *fanāʾ* in Islamic mysticism means not extinction but complete surrender of the human ego to the Divine Ego. The ideal of Islamic mysticism is a stage beyond the stage of *fanāʾ*, i.e., *baqāʾ*, which, from my point of view, is the highest stage of self-affirmation.[116]

Although *fanāʾ* and *baqāʾ* are well-known Sufi terms, the confusion and misinterpretation of them has persisted into modern times, as illustrated in Iqbāl's own remarks. Crucially, as mentioned earlier, Iqbāl misinterprets the concept of *fanāʾ* as "loss of individuality" or "negation of selfhood." This differs widely from the understanding of these terms held by Sufis such as Shabistarī. As Cyrus Zargar cogently elucidates, the technical terms annihilation of the self (*fanāʾ al-nafs*) and annihilation in God (*fanāʾ fi-l-llāh*) do not indicate a total loss of one's attributes of selfhood, which Zargar aptly terms "self-loss."[117] According to Zargar, self-loss differs from *fanāʾ* because in the former the individual loses his own personal traits and sense of self in approaching God through His attributes, whereas the latter signals a completion of this process. Understood in this way, *fanāʾ* is not only a stage in the Sufi path, but also a matter of perception or a realization. It is important to note as well that traditional Sufi accounts of *fanāʾ* did not understand it to be an isolated phenomenon. Rather, *fanāʾ* is consistently presented as complemented by an additional spiritual phenomenon, namely subsistence (*baqāʾ*) through God.[118] It is by means of this subsistence that the annihilated self returns to creation and continues to live among and interact with other human beings. This is facilitated by the individual soul's acquisition of divine attributes, which transform its imperfect or blameworthy human attributes.[119] Taken within this broader context, it is therefore problematic to think that annihilation (*fanāʾ*) implies a mere negation of selfhood in the sense that Iqbāl asserts.

The disparity between Iqbāl's concept of *fanāʾ* and the way that this concept has been historically interpreted can be further illustrated by examining the complex analyses of *fanāʾ* and *baqāʾ* that appear in the work of Iqbāl's predecessor, Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlawī (d. 1762), whom in his own writings Iqbāl holds in high regard.[120] According to Shāh Walī Allāh, the annihilation of spiritual existence (*fanāʾ-i wujūd-i rūḥānī*) and the subsistence of divinity (*baqāʾ-i wujūd-i lāhūt*) are terms that refer to the subjugating force of the God/the Real (*ghalaba kardan-i ḥaqq*) over the created being, and the power which

concealed the subtle fields of consciousness (*laṭāʾif*) exert over all the other fields of consciousness, or, expressed alternatively, over the faculty of the sacred light and the pure intellect (*ʿaql-i ṣirf*).[121] He elaborates further:

> For every subtle field of consciousness (*laṭīfa*) there is annihilation (*fanāʾ*) and subsistence (*baqāʾ*). But the meaning of annihilation and subsistence in this context is not what is imagined by the masses, which is that you become non-existent or you shed the cloth of your self (*nafs*) and acquire new clothes for it. Rather, the meanings of annihilation and subsistence are related to that which overcomes and that which is overcome. When something of this [particular] *laṭīfa* … overcomes a human, he is overcome by it, and there appears in him characteristics which make others say, "the man is annihilated in such and such a thing or subsisted by it." There are different types of annihilation and subsistence. Whenever a human being progresses from one *laṭīfa* to the next, he is annihilated by the first *laṭīfa* and subsisted by the second *laṭīfa*. Sometimes it is also said that he is annihilated by the *laṭīfa* X and subsisted by the *laṭīfa* Y.[122]

Overall, Shāh Walī Allāh explicates *fanāʾ* and *baqāʾ* in terms of the *laṭāʾif*, which is consistent with his own understanding of the self.[123] One key takeaway from this passage is that in Shāh Walī Allāh's view, *fanāʾ* does not consist in becoming altogether non-existent, as expressed spiritually or psychologically through the negation of selfhood.[124] Rather, it is the power of the Realm of Mercy (*raḥamūt*) or the universal soul that overcomes the individual self through its own attributes. It is in this sense that Shāh Walī Allāh rejects the notion that *fanāʾ* is an absolute negation of self, as expressed in the metaphor of exchanging one's clothes. Instead, he outlines a more subtle and progressive process in which individual attributes are alternated in a continuing process of annihilation and subsistence.

This more nuanced picture of *fanāʾ* is further refined by Shāh Walī Allāh's enumeration of different types of annihilation and subsistence, which make it a complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced to a simple either/or category. In his view, this process can assume two distinct forms. The first of these involves a progression from what Shāh Walī Allāh calls "annihilation of the dark existence" (*fanāʾ al-wujūd al-ẓulmānī*) to "subsistence through spiritual existence" (*baqāʾ al-wujūd al-rūḥānī*). The second type of spiritual process, on the other hand, involves progression from "annihilation of the spiritual existence" (*fanāʾ al-wujūd al-rūḥānī*) to "subsistence of the divine existence" (*baqāʾ al-wujūd al-ilāhī*).[125] Referring to the first set of terms, Shāh Walī Allāh explains that the term "annihilation of the dark existence" (*fanāʾ al-wujūd al-ẓulmānī*) refers to a state in which humans are mired in acts that pay no attention to the divine. This is followed by "subsistence through spiritual existence" (*baqāʾ al-wujūd al-rūḥānī*), in which the individual's spiritual state is transformed through the process of submitting their will to the divine. This stage of the spiritual path is also largely facilitated by invocation of God (*dhikr Allāh*). As for the second set of terms,



Figure 1: The Laṭāʾif and Selfhood, Based on Shāh Walī Allāh's Own Diagram

Shāh Walī Allāh characterizes this spiritual progression as one that operates by means of the manifest *laṭāʾif* (subtle fields of consciousness) are overcome by the concealed *laṭāʾif.* This process can also be expressed in cosmological terms, as Shāh Walī Allāh also frames it as a progression from microcosmic to macrocosmic *laṭāʾif,* as shown in Figure 1, below.[126]

As illustrated through the figure below, Shāh Walī Allāh identifies the rational soul as the junction (*mawḍiʿ*) between the microcosmic and the macrocosmic *laṭāʾif,* represented in the lower and upper portions of his diagram, respectively. From this central position, the seeker has two distinct paths by which they can ascend through the macrocosmic *laṭāʾif* to reach the Pure Self. The first of these, illustrated on the left-hand side of the diagram, involves a spiritual ascent through the arcanum (*khafī*) and Ultimate Selfhood (*al-anāniyya al-kubrā*). Alternatively, the seeker can take the path illustrated on the right-hand side of the diagram, which involves traversing the *laṭāʾif* known as the Light of the Holy (*nūr al-quds*) and the Philosopher's Stone (*ḥajar-i baḥt*).[127] Both of these paths result in reaching the divine, which becomes the locus of the seeker's annihilation and subsistence. This foray into Shāh Walī Allāh's concept of *fanāʾ* serves to highlight two points concerning Iqbāl's treatment of the topic. First, it is immediately clear that the classical conception of *fanāʾ* outlined by Sufi authors such as Shāh Walī Allāh is far more complex than the simplistic notion of *fanāʾ* that Iqbāl finds objectionable. Secondly, it is clear that even in the case of Sufi authors whom Iqbāl himself admires, such as Shāh Walī Allāh, he does not sufficiently engage with their works to the extent necessary to inform his broader attempt at reconstructing the Islamic religious and intellectual tradition.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to demonstrate that there is sufficient reason to argue that Muḥammad Iqbāl systematically misreads various concepts derived from premodern Islamic intellectual traditions to advance his own project of reconstructing Islam in light of modern challenges. In *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Iqbāl expounds on the nature of these challenges, which he identifies with crises engendered by the rise of modern science that challenge the conventional understanding and interpretation of religion. The solution to this, according to Iqbāl, does not consist in a complete break with the past. Rather, the modern Muslim must confront the challenge of modern science and must endeavor to rethink the entire Islamic tradition, while refraining from rejecting it *in toto*. In more concrete terms, Iqbāl proposes that the teachings of Islam be understood and interpreted "in light of modern knowledge."[128] As shown throughout the course of this article, Iqbāl provides numerous examples illustrating what such a reconstruction or reinterpretation would look like in practice. In other words, interpreting Islam in light of modern knowledge

implies reading and explaining various premodern Islamic thinkers in light of modern systems of knowledge. Hence, Iqbāl reads Bīdil in light of Bergson, al-Jīlī in light of Hegel, selfhood and consciousness in relation to Einstein's physics, and Sufism in conversation with Nietzsche.

As demonstrated throughout this article, Iqbāl's intellectual project, while well-intentioned, is based on a questionable methodological foundation that requires further interrogation. Specifically, it is important to ask two primary questions: first, what it exactly means to rethink Islam in light of modern knowledge, and second whether such a hermeneutical method is internally sound and consistent. Given the content and presentation of Iqbāl's ideas, one may reasonably ask whether rethinking Islam entails subordinating its indigenous intellectual traditions to those of modern scientific and philosophical disciplines. In this regard, does rethinking Islam in the modern age mean merely reading various modern ideas into premodern Islamic texts, as Iqbāl himself often does throughout his works? Does this process not ultimately distort the texts under consideration by projecting onto them ideas that are extraneous not only to the texts themselves, but also to the intellectual and historical context in which they were produced? The problematic hermeneutical implications of such an approach are not difficult to grasp, as this method does not attempt to understand the texts or the intellectual traditions on their own terms. This applies equally in the cases of interpreting entire authors and concepts. As discussed above, Iqbāl's own application of this method is rife with errors, inconsistencies, and misrepresentations. For instance, Bīdil in light of Bergson is so radically transfigured as to be hardly recognizable as the historical Bīdil. Similarly, Iqbāl's treatment of the concept of the self in Islam or the concept of annihilation (*fanā'*) do not accurately or faithfully represent the premodern tradition that he ostensibly attempts to reconstruct. In the case of Iqbāl's own scholarship, this problematic method has been further complicated by the fact that Iqbāl not only lacked the knowledge necessary to interpret texts from the premodern Islamic tradition, but moreover that he frequently relied on secondary sources rather than directly engaging with the primary sources that he himself cites and critiques. Additionally, this article has demonstrated that Iqbāl's attempts to read premodern Islamic texts in light of modern philosophy and science are undermined by his own lack of deep knowledge in the latter fields, resulting in his reliance, instead, on popular interpretations of topics such as evolutionary biology and Einsteinian physics to advance his own idiosyncratic interpretation of Islam and the Islamic intellectual heritage. While Iqbāl's project to integrate the findings of modern science and philosophy into an Islamic worldview was certainly well-intentioned, as this article has demonstrated it was a deeply flawed project, recognition of which can only undermine the popular and academic appreciation of Iqbāl as a heroic reformer of Islam.

Recognizing these shortcomings in Iqbāl's methodology can in turn stimulate productive conversations and new ways of thinking about how texts and systems of knowledge from distinct intellectual traditions can be reconciled. Just as Iqbāl is entitled to argue that rethinking Islam means reinterpreting it in light of modern knowledge, could one not attempt, conversely, to reinterpret modern knowledge in light of the Islamic intellectual tradition? What insights can be gained through an alternative approach that reexamines modern philosophical and scientific thought through the lens of Sufi metaphysics or classical Islamic philosophy? Perhaps most importantly, the defects in Iqbāl's approach demonstrate the importance of insisting that authors like Shabistarī, Ibn ʿArabī, or al-Jīlī be understood on their own terms, and only then be put into conversation with trends in modern thought.

Endnotes

1. On the need for such a thorough reassessment, see Sajjad Rizvi, "Between Hegel and Rumi: Iqbāl's Contrapuntal Encounters with the Islamic Philosophical traditions," in *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Essays on the Reconstruction of Modern Muslim Thought*, ed. H. C. Hillier and Basit Bilal Koshul (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 123.

2. Both critics and supporters of Iqbāl may argue that his project intended to build a new foundation for Islamic thought in the face of modernity, and that this did not necessitate a deep engagement with premodern Islamic intellectual traditions, which he may have considered them irrelevant to modern challenges. This, however, goes against the numerous references to various Muslim thinkers in Iqbāl's writings.

3. The information concerning Iqbāl's biography is based on the following sources: Iqbāl Singh, *The Ardent Pilgrim: An Introduction to the Life and Work of Muḥammad Iqbāl* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 5–66; Annemarie Schimmel, *Gabriel's Wings: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muḥammad Iqbāl* (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 1989), pp. 1–87; Iqbāl S. Sevea, *The Political Philosophy of Muḥammad Iqbāl* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1–35. For the chronology of Iqbāl's works, see Khurram Shafique, *Iqbāl: An Illustrated Biography* (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 2006), pp. 203–208. For a detailed record of works on Iqbāl's life and thought as well as his translations into various eastern and Western languages see Rafi' al-Dīn Hashmi, *Kitābiyāt-i Iqbāl* (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 1977).

4. Iqbāl narrated an account detailing the Sufi background of his family to his close friend Atiya Begum, whom he met in London, which, in her view, allowed one to better understand him and his oeuvre, especially many of the "ideas that may appear obscure" in his written work. See Atiya Begum, *Iqbāl*, ed. Rauf Parekh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 4–5.

5. On Sayyid Mīr Ḥasan, see Sayyid Maḥmūd Ḥusayn, *Shams al-ʿUlamāʾ Mawlavī Sayyid Mīr Ḥasan: Ḥayāt u Afkār* (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 2007), p. 10 ff.

6. Although Iqbāl applied for a PhD in philosophy, he was not granted one. See Shafique, *Iqbāl: An Illustrated Biography*, p. 44.

7. This lecture, entitled "Is Religion Possible?" forms the seventh chapter of *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. It was also published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 33 (1933): pp. 47–64, as well as in *The Muslim Revival* (Lahore), 1, no. 4 (1932): pp. 329–49.

8. In one of his later works, Sayyid Quṭb praises Iqbāl's concept of selfhood as a time-honored idea that Muslims needed in order to cope with the challenges of the modern world.

See Sayyid Quṭb, *The Islamic Concept and Its Characteristics*, trans. Mohammed M. Siddiqui (Oak Brook: American Trust Publications, 1991), pp. 13–16; cf. idem., *al-ʿAdāla al-Ijtimāʿīyya fi-l-Islām* (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1975), pp. 32–43.

9. See Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Faylasūf al-Dhātīyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Madār al-Islāmī, 2009).

10. See Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* ed. M. Saeed Sheikh (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 78.

11. An example of the nativist approach is Muḥammad Rafī al-Dīn's monumental work *Ḥikmat-i Iqbāl* (The Wisdom of Iqbāl) in which he says: "After years of studying Iqbāl, I came to the conclusion that his concepts are scientifically and rationally quite spontaneous, forceful, correct and irrefutable … In other words, my conclusion was that Iqbāl's philosophy, like all other different main philosophies of the world, is potentially a complete and continuous philosophy of man and universe the distinguishing feature of which is that its concepts are intellectually and logically ordered and organized which makes it effective and convincing." Muḥammad Rafī al-Dīn, *Ḥikmat-i Iqbāl: Kalām-i Iqbāl kī Rawshanī Mayn Iqbāl kī Falsafa-yi Khūdī kī Mufaṣṣal awr Munaẓẓam Tashrīḥ* (Lahore: ʿIlmī Kutub Khāna, 1968), pp. 1–2; translated by S. D. Mahmud, *The Philosophy of Iqbāl*, (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 2016), pp. 15–16.

12. Hamilton A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. ix–x.

13. W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (Delhi: Usha, 1985), p. 122.

14. Fazlur Rahman, "Iqbāl and Modern Muslim Thought," in *Studies in Iqbāl's Thought and Art*, ed. M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Bazm-i Iqbāl, 1972), p. 43.

15. Riffat Hassan, "Introduction," in *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Essays on the Reconstruction of Modern Muslim Thought*, ed. H. C. Hillier and Basit Bilal Koshul (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 1. Sheila McDonough expresses a similar view, writing: "There is nothing in the Muslim or the Western tradition that can quite be compared to Iqbāl's poetic enterprise." Sheila McDonough, *The Authority of the Past: A Study of Three Muslim Modernists* (Chambersburgh, PA: American Academy of Religion, 1970), p. 17.

16. Riffat Hassan, "Introduction," p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 3. See also her useful book on Iqbāl: Riffat Hassan, *An Iqbāl Primer: An Introduction to Iqbāl's Philosophy* (Lahore: Aziz, 1979).

18. See Qur'ān 95:4–5.

19. Riffat Hassan, "Introduction," p. 3. Hassan further notes: "But as he grappled with the particular issues that confronted the Muslim community of India during the final, and most difficult, phase of its struggle for freedom from alien domination - whether of the British or of the Hindus - Iqbāl developed a philosophical vision that was not bound to any land or time."

20. Ebrahim Moosa, "The Human Person in Iqbāl's Thought," in Muḥammad Iqbāl: Essays on the Reconstruction of Modern Muslim Thought, ed. H. C. Hillier and Basit Bilal Koshul (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 12.

21. Ibid., p. 14. Cf. Leszek Kołakowski, *The Presence of Myth*, trans. Adam Czerniawski (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 2.

22. Ebrahim Moosa, "The Human Person in Iqbāl's Thought," pp. 25–26.

23. Sulaymane Diagne, "Achieving Humanity: Convergence between Henri Bergson and Muḥammad Iqbāl," in *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Essays on the Reconstruction of Modern Muslim Thought*, ed. H. C. Hillier and Basit Bilal Koshul (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), pp. 36–38.

24. Ibid., p. 36. Cf. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 83.

25. Souleymane Bachir Diagne, *Islam et société ouverte: la fidélité et le mouvement dans la philosophie de Muḥammad Iqbāl*, (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2001), pp. 20–40.

26. Diagne, "Achieving Humanity," p. 40. Emphasis added.

27. Diagne also notes that the goal of the ego is to become an "accomplished human," which he equates with the Sufi doctrine of the perfect human. Moreover, despite ample evidence of intellectual dynamism in the post-classical period (post ca. 1250 CE), Diagne reiterates the discredited view that Islamic philosophy ceased to develop past the thirteenth century CE, characterizing Iqbāl's project of "reconstruction" as a way out of this petrification. See Diagne, "Achieving Humanity," pp. 40, 45.

28. Ebrahim Moosa, "The Human Person in Iqbāl's Thought," p. 17. Ebrahim Moosa is not alone in this opinion. See also: Muntasir Mir, *Iqbāl: Makers of Islamic Civilization* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 142–46; "Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938): The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam," in *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Khalid El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 608–627; Saeed Sheikh, "Introduction" in Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. xxxii ff. For a slightly more critical perspective on Iqbāl's works, especially in relation to his theology, see Salman Raschid, *Iqbāl's Concept of God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

29. Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Shikwa wa Jawāb-i Shikwa* (Complaint and Answer): *Iqbāl's Dialogue with Allah*, trans. Khushwant Singh (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 8.

30. For a detailed analysis of Nietzsche's influence on Iqbāl, see Muhammad Faruque, "A Nietzschean Mystic? Muḥammad Iqbāl on the Ethics of Selfhood," in *Mysticism and Ethics in Islam*, ed. Bilal Orfali et al. (Beirut: The American University of Beirut Press, 2022), pp. 419–430. As Nietzsche's Zarathustra proclaims, the perfection of the superhuman (*Übermensch*) is attained through overcoming the human: "I teach to you the *Übermensch*, the human is something that shall be overcome." Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* trans. Graham Parkes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 11. This means that the *Übermensch* arises from the act of transcending the anthropocentric worldview. For more on Nietzsche's characterization of the *Übermensch,* see his *Thus Spoke Zarathustra,* pp. 11–16, 18, 21, 31, 33, 45, 49, 54, 57, 62, 67, 123, 171, 184, 193, 250–251.

31. Iqbāl, "In Defense of the Self," in *Discourses of Iqbāl*, ed. Shahid H. Razzaqi (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1979), p. 196.

32. Similar tendencies are observable in the works of many of Iqbāl's near contemporaries, including Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898). See *The Cambridge Companion to Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, ed. Yasmin Saikia and M. Raisur Rahman (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

33. Muḥammad Iqbāl, "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity as Expounded by ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī," *The Indian Antiquary* 29 (1900): pp. 237–46; republished in *The Discourses of Iqbāl*, ed. Shahid H. Razzaqi (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1979), p. 117.

34. Ibid., p. 117.

35. Ibid., pp. 117–118.

36. Challenging Ernest Renan's (d. 1892) infamous thesis that philosophy disappeared in Islamic lands after the death of Abū'l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Rushd, aka Averroes (d. 1198 CE), recent scholarship has seen a proliferation in post-Avicennan studies. It is noteworthy, however, that despite Renan's thesis being widely discredited in contemporary scholarship, there is a tendency for some scholars to claim that Islamic philosophy only continued in Persia in the post-classical period (after ca. 1250 CE). This claim is often made with reference to al-Ghazālī's famous attack on philosophy. This claim too has been contradicted by recent studies, which have demonstrated the persistence of Islamic philosophy in various Islamic lands such as Egypt, Ottoman Turkey,

and Muslim India, up to the twentieth century. On this topic, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 173 ff. and 357–358; Asad Ahmed, "Post-Classical Philosophical Commentaries/Glosses: Innovation in the Margins," *Oriens* 41, no. 3-4 (2013): pp. 317–348; and Robert Wisnovsky, "The Nature and Scope of Arabic Philosophical Commentary in Post-Classical (ca. 1100–1900 AD) Islamic Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations," in *Philosophy, Science, and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic, and Latin Commentaries,* ed. Peter Adamson, H. Baltussen, and M.W.F. Stone (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2004).

37. Iqbāl, "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity," p. 119.

38. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, *Al-Insān al-Kāmil fī Maʿrifat al-Awākhir wa al-Awāʾil* (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Tārīkh al-ʿArabī, 2000), v. 1, p. 37.

39. Iqbāl, "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity," pp. 119–20.

40. On al-Jīlī's concept of the perfect human (*al-insān al-kāmil*), see the introduction to ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī, *De l'Homme Universel,* translated by Titus Burckhardt (Paris: Devry-livres, 1975); Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p. 279 ff.; George Anawati, "La doctrine de l'homme parfait selon ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī," *Mélanges de l'Institut dominicain d'études orientales* 22 (1995): pp. 57–72; Suʿād al-Ḥakīm, *Ibdāʿ al-Kitāba wa Kitābat al-Ibdāʿ: ʿAyn ʿAlāal-ʿAynīya: Sharḥ Muʿāṣir li-ʿAynīyat al-Imām al-Ṣūfī ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Jīlī* (Beirut: Dār al-Burāq, 2004), pp. 1–20.

41. al-Jīlī, *Al-Insān al-Kāmil*, v. 2, p. 46.

42. Iqbāl, "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity," p. 121.

43. For more on this, see William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-ʿArabī's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 91–92, 164, 196, 216–220.

44. The words *annīyya* and *innīyya* are almost certainly derived from the conjunction *anna* (that) or from the adverb *inna* (truly). In his *al-Taʿrīfāṭ* (The Identification), the Persian encyclopedist ʿAlī bin Muḥammad al-Jurjānī (d. 1414 CE) defines it as "the realization of individual existence in view of its essential degree," which is also found in ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī's (d. ca. 1329 CE) *Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Ṣūfīyya* (Sufi Terminology). The so-called "Kindī circle" first developed the term *annīyya* as a translation of the Greek infinitive *einai* (to be, being), which in Arabic transliteration reads as *annīyya.* Richard Frank argues that the true origin of the term is to be found in Syriac rather than in Greek, which, however, is not the prevalent view. In any case, the notion that *annīyya* connotes existence at the level of the individual resulted in a trend in Sufism to relate it to the first-person singular pronoun in Arabic, *anā* (I). This was most likely prompted by the analogy of the term *hūwīyya*, an abstract noun self-evidently derived from the masculine third person singular pronoun, *hūwa* (he). For more information, see Richard M. Frank, "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term *Annīyah*," *Cahiers de Byrsa* 6 (1956), pp. 181–201; and Toby Mayer, "Anniyya," in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three*, ed. Kate Fleet, et al. Consulted online on 20 December 2017 <http://dx.doi.org.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/10.1163/1573-3912_ei3_COM_22817> On *aḥadīyya* or exclusive unity pertaining to the Divine Essence, see Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 90, 278, 350.

45. Iqbāl, "The Doctrine of Absolute Unity," p. 119. These terms are not Iqbāl's translations from the original. Rather, they are foreign categories introduced by Iqbāl to explain al-Jīlī's metaphysics.

46. Ibid., p. 138.

47. Ibid., p. 138.

48. Iqbāl reiterates his conclusions about al-Jīlī in his *Development of Metaphysics*, stating that the latter anticipates German Idealism. Muḥammad Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (London: Luzac, 1908), pp. 127–131.

49. It is well- known that Iqbāl's poetry is suffused with images, motifs, and ideas drawn from Sufism, with the Sufi mystical poet Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Rūmī (d. 1273) arguably featuring as one of the strongest influences on his work. Iqbāl's philosophical writings in English also reveal significant critical engagement with the medieval Sufi tradition. Unlike many other modernists who tended to view the intellectual history of Islam as one marked by comprehensive decline since the twelfth or the thirteenth centuries CE, Iqbāl took a slightly more nuanced view. He admired what he called "devotional Sufism" while denouncing "Persian Sufism," which he equated with free speculation and life-denialism. From a purely historical point of view, this account is highly questionable, although it allowed Iqbāl to advance his particular concept of the self. See also Muḥammad Qasim Zaman, *Islam in Pakistan: A History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 196, with which this article disagrees in some respects.

50. As Iqbāl further says: "The history of man is a stern reality and the glory of human personality consists not in gradual self-evaporation but self-fortification by continual purification and assimilation. If God, as Bedil [sic] seems to teach is essentially life and movement, then it is not through an intuitive slumber, but through life and movement alone that we can approach Him. If, in any sense He has chosen to dwell within us and our personality is but a veil that hides Him from us, our duty lies not in demolishing the tiny dwelling He has chosen, but to manifest His glory through it by polishing its clay walls through action and turning them into transparent mirrors." Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Bedil in the Light of Bergson*, ed. Tehsin Firaqi (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 2000), p. 23.

51. Iqbāl, *Bedil in the Light of Bergson*, p. 23.

52. Ibid., p. 23.

53. See for example Mohammed Rustom, "Is Ibn al-ʿArabī's Ontology Pantheistic?" *Journal of Islamic Philosophy* 2, no. 1 (2006): pp. 53–67; James Morris, "Ibn ʿArabī and His Interpreters. Part II: Influences and Interpretations," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 106, no. 4 (1986): pp. 733–734; William Chittick, "Rūmī' and Waḥdat al-Wujūd," in *The Heritage of Rūmī*, ed. A. Banani (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 70–71 and Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge,* pp. 1–30. On the integration of Ibn ʿArabī's doctrines into the teachings and practices of various Sufi orders, see Michel Chodkiewicz's "The Diffusion of Ibn ʿArabī's Doctrine," *Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ʿArabi Society* 9 (1991): pp. 36–57 and Michel Chodkiewicz, *An Ocean Without Shore*, trans. David Streight (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 1–33.

54. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 114.

55. Iqbāl, *Bedil in the Light of Bergson*, p. 15.

56. On Ibn ʿArabī's influence on Bīdil, see Haji-Mohamad Bohari, "The Ideas of *Waḥdat al-Wujūd* in the Poetry of ʿAbd al-Qādir Bīdil (Persian), Ibrahim Hakkı Erzurumi (Ottoman Turkish), and Hamzah Fanṣūrī (Malay)" (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley, 1989), p. 198 ff. On the notion of a "dream within a dream," see Oludamini Ogunnaike, "Inception and Ibn ʿArabī," *Journal of Religion & Film* 17, no.2 (2013): pp. 11–44, and the chapter on the prophet Joseph in Ibn ʿArabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, ed. A. E. Afifi (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1946).

57. Iqbāl, *Bedil in the Light of Bergson*, pp. 24–25. This is not to deny that there is no value whatsoever to Iqbāl's poetry in general. For the reasons stated above, the present author does not engage with Iqbāl's poetics and aesthetics, but the interested reader may benefit from the following source on these topics, see Javed Majeed, *Muḥammad Iqbāl: Islam, Aesthetics and Postcolonialism* (Delhi: Routledge, 2009).

58. Like his work on al-Jīlī and Bīdil, Iqbāl's *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* is mired in various philological inconsistencies and philosophical misreadings. Moreover, it seems that the overwhelming majority of it is based on the work of other scholars, both Muslim and Western, such

as Tāj al-Dīn Abū'l Fatḥ Shahrastānī (d. 1153 CE), Tjitze J. Boar, D. B. MacDonald (d. 1943), Shiblī Nuʿmānī (d. 1914). Moreover, his use of categories such as "Aryan," "Semite," "monism," "pantheism," are highly problematic from the view of contemporary scholarship. Iqbāl attributes the pantheism to even Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 CE) and Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191 CE). These dubious categories are not an isolated problem but reflect a general shortcoming involving Iqbāl's engagement with primary sources from Islamic intellectual traditions. His translation of al-Ghazālī's *The Deliverer from Error* (*al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*) is full of technical errors. Moreover, Iqbāl's writings are full of spurious comparisons and characterizations of primary source texts, such as his comparison between al-Ghazālī's *Revival of the Religious Sciences* (*Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn*) and René Descartes's (d. 1650 CE) *Discourse on Method*, or his choice to characterize Mullā Ṣadrā's (d. 1640 CE) philosophy as a type of monism that anticipates Bābism. Moreover, Iqbāl mistakenly identifies Suhrawardī's illuminationist (*ishrāqī*) philosophy as a school of Sufism. These errors can be partially explained by the fact that Iqbāl likely did not consult original sources. This is particularly evident in his interpretations of Suhrawardī, where his citations indicate that he likely did not have the original Suhrawardian corpus at disposal. Instead, Iqbāl references Zāhid al-Harawī's (d. 1689 CE) *Sharḥ al-Anwārīyya*, which is itself a commentary on Suhrawardī's relatively small treatise *The Temples of Light* (*Hayākil al-Nūr*). See Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, pp. 59, 60, 65, 68, 91, 94, 114, 120–1, 135–36, 143–45. Although Iqbāl distanced himself from parts of this work later in life, some of its conclusions, such as comments concerning pantheism, continued to resurface in his discussions on the relationship between Sufism and Magianism and Persian culture in later works such as the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. On Iqbāl's own reservations about *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, see B. A. Dar, *Anwār-i Iqbāl* (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy Pakistan, 1977), p. 20. For some perceptive remarks on Iqbāl's relation to Sufism and Ibn ʿArabī, see Muhammad S. Umar, "Contours of Ambivalence. Iqbāl and Ibn ʿArabī: Histori cal Perspective," *Iqbāl Review* 35, no. 3 (1994): pp. 46–62.

59. Cf. Khwaja Abdul Hamid, *Ibn Maskawaih: A Study of His al-Fauz al-Asghar* (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1946), pp. 78–83. See also Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. 29, where an account of Ibn Miskawayh's theory of evolution is given based on Shiblī Nuʿmānī's *Tārīkh-i ʿIlm-i Kalām* (Tehran: Asāṭīr, 2007), p. 135 ff.

60. On natural selection and other mechanisms of evolution, see Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1859), chapter 4; and Douglas J. Futuyma and Mark Kirkpatrick, *Evolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), chapters 3–5.

61. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 107.

62. Iqbāl was likely influenced by such popularizers of Darwinism as Thomas H. Huxley, Alfred R. Wallace and Herbert Spencer. On these figures, see Timothy Shanahan, *The Evolution of Darwinism: Selection, Adaptation, and Progress in Evolutionary Biology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 105–113, 190–218.

63. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 156. Iqbāl does not explain further what he means by Einsteinian physics banishing the concept of force. Cf. Bertrand Russell, "Relativity: Philosophical Consequences," in "Force and Gravitation," in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, pp. xix, 99.

64. Muḥammad Iqbāl, "Self in the Light of Relativity," in *The Discourses of Iqbāl*, ed. Shahid H. Razzaqi (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1979), p. 178.

65. On Einstein's assumption of realism or the spatial separability of an independent world, see Albert Einstein, "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," *Philosophy of Science* 1, no. 2 (1934): pp. 163–169. On page 167, he says: "our experience up to date justifies us in feeling sure that in Nature is actualized the ideal of mathematical simplicity. It is my conviction that pure mathematical construction enables us to discover the concepts and the laws connecting them which give us

the key to the understanding of the phenomena of Nature." See also Einstein's *Autobiographical Notes*, where he says: "Physics is an attempt to conceptually grasp reality as it is thought independently of its being observed. In this sense, one speaks of 'physical reality.'" Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes," in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*, ed. P. A. Schlipp (New York: MJF Books, 1970), p. 81. See also, Einstein, "Physik und Realität," *Journal of The Franklin Institute* 221 (1936): pp. 313–347; Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, "Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?" *Physical Review* 47 (1935): pp. 777–780. It is interesting to note that while Iqbāl did not meet with Einstein, his contemporary, the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore (d. 1941), did in fact meet him in 1930, and the two engaged in a long dialogue about the nature of reality. Einstein asserted the stance adopted by the scientists in general, namely that reality is something independent of the human mind. Tagore, drawing on the insights found in Indian philosophy, argued for a "relational" view of the world, in which the subject is never separate from the object. See A. Einstein and R. Tagore, *Living Age* 340 (1931): p. 262; Partha Ghose, *Einstein, Tagore and the Nature of Reality* (London, NY: Routledge, 2016), Chs. 1 and 5; David L. Gosling, *Science and the Indian tradition: When Einstein Met Tagore* (London, NY: Routledge, 2007), pp. 130–50.

66. Iqbāl, "Self in the Light of Relativity," pp. 178–179.

67. Ibid., pp. 178.

68. Iqbāl, "Self in the Light of Relativity," pp. 181–182.

69. See Qur'ān 50:16, 58:7, and Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 107–08.

70. Here, as well as in lectures five and seven of the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, Iqbāl mistakenly refers to the Sufi poet as Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī. In reality, this excerpt was written by Tāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Khudādād Ashnawī (d. ca. 1222 CE). Cf. Ashnawī's treatise: *Ghāyat al-Imkān fi Maʿrifat al-Zamān w'al-Makān,* ed. Nadhr Sābirī (Campbellpur, 1981).

71. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 55–56. Nonetheless, not all of Iqbāl's speculations about Islamic philosophy were wrong. He is correct to suggest that Suhrawardī and the theologian and jurist Taqī ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymīyya (d. 1328 CE) undertook a systematic refutation of Greek logic. See Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p.10.

72. A "manifold" is a conglomeration of local spaces, each of which may be mapped by either a flat or Cartesian coordinate map without allowing for a global Euclidean structure as a whole, except in the limited case of Euclidean space itself. On the concept of "manifold," see Riemann's famous Habilitation dissertation of 1854, which paved the way for theories of hyperspace and of relativity: Bernhard Riemann, *On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Bases of Geometry*, trans. William K. Clifford (Cham: Springer, 2016), pp. 30–41. For helpful explanations on this, see John McCleary, *Geometry from a Differentiable Viewpoint* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 269–78.

73. It is important to keep in mind that Iqbāl had a keen interest in mathematics, which is evinced by the two long letters, preserved in Allama Iqbāl Museum, Lahore, of a purely mathematical nature written to him by a certain Faḍl Ḥamīd on July 19th, 1928 and July 27th, 1935. For more information on this, see Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 190, n.21.

74. For a wide-ranging and excellent critique of such teleological interpretations, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, *Islamic Intellectual History in the Seventeenth Century: Scholarly Currents in the Ottoman Empire and the Maghreb* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 356–358.

75. See also, Iqbāl, *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī* (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1973), pp. 652, 653, 666, 668, 740, 767, 878, 948.

76. Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Jāwīd-nāma*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī* (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1973), p. 766.

77. In his *Stray Reflections*, Iqbāl notes: "I confess I owe a great deal to Hegel, Goethe, Mirza Ghalib, Mirza Abdul Qadir Bedil and Wordsworth. The first two led me into the 'inside' of things; the third and fourth taught me how to remain oriental in spirit and expression after having assimilated foreign ideals of poetry, and the last saved me from atheism in my student days." Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Stray Reflections: The Private Notebook of Muḥammad Iqbāl*, ed. Javid Iqbāl (Lahore: Iqbāl Academy, 2008), p. 53. Concerning Iqbāl's admiration for Nietzsche, see Atiya Begum, *Iqbāl*, pp. 5, 35.

78. Iqbāl, *Jāwīd-nāma*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 767.

79. Muḥammad Iqbāl, *Bāl-i Jibrīl*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Urdū* (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1973), p. 354.

80. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 77.

81. On Magianism in Islam, see Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 77, 114–15, 124. See also Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, pp. 4, 99, 147–148, and Iqbāl, *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, pp. 209, 264, 386, 415, 470, 484, 511, 561, 823.

82. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 77. Unlike philosophical Sufism, Iqbāl spares "devotional Sufism" from his forceful critique. Despite characterizing al-Ḥallāj's Sufism as pantheism in *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* Iqbāl offers a different opinion, stating that the al-Ḥallāj's famous expression "I am the Real" (*anā al-Ḥaqq*) represents the pinnacle of Sufi thought. This is due to Massignon's research on Ḥallāj, which convinced Iqbāl that this famous statement did not in fact deny the transcendence of God, again demonstrating Iqbāl's reliance on secondary scholarship for his sweeping conclusions on the history of Islamic thought.

83. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 77.

84. Iqbāl, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 80. Needless to say, it would be inaccurate to describe al-Ghazālī as a mind-body dualist. For a detailed understanding of selfhood in his work, see Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Kīmiyā-yi Saʿādat*, ed. Ḥusayn Khadīvjam (Tehran: Markaz-i Intishārāt-i ʿIlmī wa Farhangī, 1983), p. 10 ff.

85. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqīyya* (Qom: Intishārāt-i Bidār, n. d.), v. 2, pp. 345–346. See also Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī 1987), v. 7, p. 57ff., where he presents his more mature views.

86. See for example ʿAḍud al-Dīn Ījī, *al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām* (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub [n.d.]), pp. 241–260.

87. For an analysis of the concept of the self in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā, see Muhammad Faruque, *Sculpting the Self: Islam, Selfhood, and Human Flourishing* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2021), pp. 70–85, 104–120. For more on the concept of consciousness in Islamic philosophy, see Jari Kaukua, *Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

88. Iqbāl also explicitly mentions René Descartes in this regard, whose view on mind-body dualism he rejects, alongside that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (d. 1716 CE). Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 83.

89. Iqbāl defines matter as "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of coordination." This means for Iqbāl that matter is not purely physical, which in his view is "incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind." Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 84–85. This view of matter is similar to Russellian neutral monism, in which the distinction between the mental and the physical fades away. See Galen Strawson, "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13, no.10, 11 (2006): pp. 3–31; and Galen Strawson, "Mind and Being. The Primacy of Panpsychism," in *Panpsychism: Contemporary*

Perspectives, ed. Godehard Brüntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 161–208.

90. It is interesting that even though Iqbāl was aware of the concept of the animal spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥayawānī*), which acts as an intermediary between body and soul in Mullā Ṣadrā's psychology, he does not mention it here. A reference to the animal spirit does appear, however, in his *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, where Iqbāl refers to it as the medium that allows the transmission of "directly received light to the dark solid body." Iqbāl, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, p. 109.

91. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 83–84

92. Iqbāl, *Jāwīd-nāma*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 612.

93. Ibid., p. 751. See also the following excerpt from later in the same work: "So long as the heart (*dil*) is free, the body (*tan*) is free, / else, the body is a straw in the path of the wind. / Like the body, the heart too is bound by laws – / the heart dies of hatred, lives of faith." Iqbāl, *Jāwīd-nāma*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 766.

94. For a systematic treatment of the Iqbālian self, see Faruque, *Sculpting the Self*, pp. 59–60, 121–140, 254–266.

95. For more information, see Faruque, "A Nietzschean Mystic?"

96. Iqbāl, *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 537, trans. Ahmad Dar, modified.

97. Ibid., p. 552, modified.

98. Ibid., pp. 552–553, modified.

99. Ibid., p. 553, modified.

100. Maḥmūd Shabistarī, *Gulshan-i Rāz*, ed. Parvīz ʿAbbāsī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Ilhām, 2002), p. 58. Echoes of the final portion of this quote from Shabistarī are also found in the work of Afḍal al-Dīn Kāshānī, aka Bābā Afḍal (d. ca. 1214 CE). See Bābā Afḍal, *Muṣannafāt-i Afḍal al-Dīn Muḥammad Maraqī Kāshānī*, ed. Mujtabá Mīnuvī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Khwārizmī, 1987), p. 754.

101. See Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā Lāhījī, *Mafātīḥ al-Iʿjāz fī Sharḥ-i Gulshan-i Rāz*, ed. Maḥmūdī Bakhtiyārī (Tehran: ʿIlm, 1998), pp. 232–234.

102. Lāhījī, *Mafātīḥ*, pp. 238–39.

103. He also refers to this as "the complete man" (*mard-i tamām*).

104. Iqbāl, *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 550, trans. Ahmad Dar, modified.

105. Ibid., p. 558, modified. Shabistarī generally uses the expression "the complete man" (*mard-i tamām*) instead of the "perfect human" (*insān-i kāmil*), although the latter also appears in his work. See Shabistarī, *Gulshan-i Rāz*, p. 20.

106. Iqbāl, *Gulshan-i Rāz-i Jadīd*, in *Kulliyāt-i Iqbāl Fārsī*, p. 558, trans. Ahmad Dar, modified.

107. Ibid., p. 559, trans. Ahmad Dar, modified.

108. Ibid., p. 551, modified.

109. Ibid., p. 561, modified.

110. Ibid., p. 561, modified.

111. Ibid., p. 561–562, modified.

112. Ibid., p. 562, modified.

113. Ibid., p. 562, modified.

114. Ibid., p. 562–563, modified.

115. For Ibn ʿArabī's perspective on this verse, see William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, pp. 218–220.

116. Iqbāl, "An Exposition of the Self," in *Discourses of Iqbāl*, ed. Shahid H. Razzaqi (Lahore: Ghulām ʿAlī, 1979), p. 202.

117. Cyrus Zargar, *The Polished Mirror: Storytelling and the Pursuit of Virtue in Islamic Philosophy and Sufism* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2017), p. 243.

118. Ibid., p. 243.

119. Ibid., p. 243.

120. Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, pp. 92, 97.

121. Shāh Walī Allāh, *Alṭāf al-Quds* (Gujranwala: Madrasa Nuṣrat al-ʿUlūm, 1964), p. 127.

122. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya* (Hyderabad. Sindh: Shāh Walī Allāh Academy. 1967), v. 1, p. 241.

123. At other times, however, Shāh Walī Allāh explains *fanāʾ* in noetic terms. For instance, in *al-Khayr al-Kathīr* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhira, 1974), he maintains that *fanāʾ* means having gnosis (*ʿirfān*) of God as the origin and place of return for every extant being, implying the transience of everything except the divine itself. In Shāh Walī Allāh's view, when this knowledge becomes an existential reality, the self is dyed with the dye of God. See Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Khayr al-Kathīr*, p. 62. On the history of the concept of *laṭāʾif* in Sufism, see Faruque, *Sculpting the Self*, p. 174 ff.

124. Simnānī argues against *fanāʾ*, given what he sees as the nihilistic implications of union and dissolution in God. For him, such a dissolution implies the negation of individual moral responsibility. Alternatively, Simnānī considers the human being as the pinnacle of creation, given his conception of the human being as the only creature that possesses a perfect balance of celestial and terrestrial elements and the capacity to possess divine knowledge. Accordingly, Simnānī considers eternal subsistence (*baqāʾ*) in God as the highest individual achievement. This perspective, however, differs from the Iqbālian concepts of self-negation and self-affirmation, since for Simnānī, as for other Sufis, *baqāʾ* differs from affirming God as an "ego." See Jamal Elias, *The Throne Carrier of God: The Life and Thought of ʿAlāʾ ad-Dawla as-Simnānī* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 98–99.

125. Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya,* v. 1, pp. 242–243.

126. Based on Shāh Walī Allāh's own diagram with some modification, see idem., *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya,* v. 1, p. 244. In his own commentary on this diagram, Shāh Walī Allāh explicitly mentions the rational soul (*al-nafs al-nāṭiqa*) or the self as the junction between the microcosmic and the macrocosmic *laṭāʾif* at the junction of *akhfā* (super arcanum). He states that the rational soul has four frames of reference (*anẓār*), the two below being the spirit (*rūḥ*) and secret (*sirr*), whereas the two above are the arcanum (*khafī*) and the light of the holy (*nūr al-quds*). See Shāh Walī Allāh, *al-Tafhīmāt al-Ilāhiyya,* v. 1, p. 244.

127. The concept of the philosopher's stone (*ḥajar-i baḥt*) is also found in Ibn ʿArabī's work. In an unpublished letter, Walī Allāh explicitly references this, recounting that in the works of Ibn ʿArabī this *laṭīfa* is referred to as the philosopher's stone because of its marvelous and perplexing nature. This was due to the fact that the *ḥajar-i baḥt* was thought to indicate a mysterious substance that could not be readily classified as vegetable, or mineral because of its strange physical properties, a quality that reflected the amazing properties of this *laṭīfa.* See H.S. Nyberg, *Kleinere Schriften des Ibn al-ʿArabī* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1919), p. 221.

128. For this phrase, see Iqbāl, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought*, p. 78.

Erratum: JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021

Journal of Islamic and Muslim Studies, Volume 7, Number 1, May 2022, pp. 1-5 (Article)

Published by Indiana University Press

Erratum: JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021

Due to technical issues, diacritical marks on some letters in transliterated Arabic words were missing in several articles in JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021. The authors and titles of the articles are listed below. The missing diacritical marks have been corrected for "print on demand orders," and the online versions on Project Muse. This technical issue does not reflect errors on the part of the authors. Diacritical marks in transliterated Arabic words present an ongoing challenge to publishers as printing and publication technology evolves.

(1) In the article **"What Did God Intend to Say? Arabic Semantics as a Legal and Cognitive Enterprise,"** by Ahmad Z. Obiedat, which appeared on pages 1–42 of JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021 issue, the author's name was listed incorrectly. "Ahmad Z. Obiedat" should read as "A. Z. Obiedat." Diacritical marks on some letters in transliterated Arabic words were missing.

DOI:10.2979/jims.6.2.01

Throughout this article, all instances of the following transliterated Arabic words have been corrected to reflect the accurate diacritics.
It was printed "Hadith" and should have been "Ḥadith"
It was printed "ahadith" and should have been "aḥadīth"
It was printed "Hanafi" and should have been "Ḥanafī"
It was printed "Hanafite" and should have been "Ḥanafite"
It was printed "Muhammad" and should have been "Muḥammad"
It was printed "Ibn Hazm" and should have been "Ibn Ḥazm"
It was printed "Ahmad" and should have been "Aḥmad"
It was printed "Abu Ishaq" and should have been printed "abu Isḥaq"
It was printed "ahaduhumā sahibahu" and should have been "aḥaduhumā ṣaḥibahu"
It was printed "tawhid" and should have been "tawḥīd"
It was printed "tarjih" and should have been "tarjiḥ"
It was printed "hukm" and should have been "ḥukm"

It was printed “al-muhkam” and should have been “al-muḥkam”
It was printed Mafatih” and should have been “Mafātīḥ”
It was printed “Mahmūd” and should have been “Maḥmūd”
It was printed “Muhyī al-Dīn” and should have been “Muḥyī al-Dīn”
It was printed “nahw” and should have been printed “naḥw”
It was printed “w’al-aswāt” and should have been printed “w’al-aṣwāt”
It was printed “al-Usul al-fiqh” and should have been “al-Uṣūl al-fiqh”
It was printed as “al-Usūliyya” and should have been “al-Uṣūliyya”
It was printed “al-maslaha” and should have been “al-maṣlaḥa”
It was printed “al-Mustasfā” and should have been “al-Mustaṣfā”
It was printed “takhsīs” and should have been “takhṣīṣ”
It was printed “al-nass” and should have been “al-naṣṣ”
It was printed “khussisa” and should have been “khuṣṣiṣa”
It was printed “al-khāss” and should have been “al-khāṣṣ”
It was printed “al-zāhir” and should have been “al-ẓāhir”
It was printed “zāhirī” and should have been printed “ẓāhirī”
It was printed “al-zuhur” and should have been “al-ẓuhūr”
It was printed “al-iqtidā’ ” and should have been “al-iqtiḍā’ ”
It was printed “darūra” should have been “ḍarūra”
It was printed “al-bātin” and should have been “al-bāṭin”
It was printed “shari’ a” and should have been “shāriʿa”
It was printed “Qaṣd al-Shāriʿa” and should have been “Qaṣd al-Shāriʿ ”
It was printed “Shī’ī” and should have been “Shīʿī”
It was printed “Ibn al-’Arabī” and should have been “Ibn al-ʿArabi”
It was printed as “huruf” and should have been “ḥurūf”
It was printed “al-tafsīr bi-l-ra’i” and should have been “al-tafsīr bi-l-ra’y”
It was printed “al-Ijtihād bi-l-Ra’ī” and should have been “al-Ijtihād bi-l-ra’y”

(2) In the article “**The Crisis of Modern Subjectivity: Rethinking Muḥammad Iqal and the Islamic Tradition”** by Muhammad U. Faruque which appeared on pages 43–81 JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021, the following diacritical marks on some letters in transliterated Arabic words were missing. They have been corrected for “print on demand orders,” and the online version on Project Muse.

DOI:10.2979/jims.6.2.01

Throughout this article, all instances of the following transliterated Arabic words have been corrected to reflect the accurate diacritics.
It was printed “Mahmud” and should have been “Maḥmūd”
It was printed “dhat” and should have been “dhāṭ”
It was printed “mutlaq al-dhāt” and should have been “muṭlaq al-dhāt”
It was printed “al-asmāʾ w’al-sifāt” and should have been “al-asmāʾ w’al-ṣifāt”
It was printed “mahd” and should have been “maḥḍ”
It was printed “ahadīyya” and should have been “aḥadīyya”
It was printed “al-Futūhāt” and should have been printed “al-Futūḥāt”
It was printed “Fusūs al-Hikam” and should have been “Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam”
It was printed “raqs-i dukhtarān-i bī-hijāb” and should have been “raqṣ-i dukhtarān-i bī-ḥijāb”
It was printed “qatʿ-i mū” and should have been “qaṭʿ-i mū”
It was printed “hikmat” and should have been “ḥikmat”
It was printed “tabʿ-i darākī” and should have been “ṭabʿ-i darākī”
It was printed “sad firdaws” and should have been “ṣad firdaws”
It was printed “dil daʿīf ast” and should have been “dil ḍaʿīf ast”
It was printed “al-Mabāhith” and should have been “al-Mabāḥith”
It was printed “al-tabīʿiyyāt” and should have been printed “al-ṭabīʿiyyāt”
It was printed “Mullā Sadrā” and should have been printed “Mullā Ṣadrā”
It was printed “mahmal” and should have been “maḥmal”
It was printed as “haqq” and should have been “ḥaqq”
It was printed “Mahmūd” and should have been “Maḥmūd”
It was printed “hayāt” and should have been “ḥayāt”
It was printed “haqīqat” and should have been “ḥaqīqat”
It was printed “arwāh” and should have been “arwāḥ”
It was printed “makhsūs” and should have been “makhṣūṣ”
It was printed “hukm” and should have been “ḥukm”
It was printed “nutq” and should have been “nuṭq”
It was printed “aʿrād” and should have been printed “aʿrāḍ”
It was printed “Yahyā” and should have been “Yaḥyā”
It was printed “al-Hallāj” and should have been “al-Ḥallāj”
It was printed “anā al-haqq” and should have been “anā al-ḥaqq”
It was printed “wahdat” should have been “waḥdat”
It was printed “tahqīq” and should have been “taḥqīq”

It was printed “haqq” and should have been “ḥaqq”
It was printed “ʿaql-i sirf” and should have been “ʿaql-i ṣirf”
It was printed “rūhānī” and should have been “rūḥānī”
It was printed “latāʾif” and should have been “laṭāʾif”
It was printed “latīfa” and should have been “laṭīfa”
It was printed “rahamūt” and should have been “raḥamūt”
It was printed “al-zulmānī” and should have been “al-ẓulmānī”
It was printed “mawdi” and should have been “mawḍi”
It was printed “hajar-i baht” and should have been “ḥajar-i baḥt”
It was printed “nātiqa” and should have been “nāṭiqa”

(3) In the article **“Rethinking Women’s Dress Prescriptions in the Qur’an: An Intratextual Reading of Zina ”** by F. Redhwan Karim which appeared on pages 82–112 JIMS Vol 6 No 2 November 2021, the following diacritical marks on some letters in transliterated Arabic words were missing. They have been corrected for “print on demand orders” and the online version on Project Muse.

DOI:10.2979/jims.6.2.01

Throughout this article, all instances of the following transliterated Arabic words have been corrected to reflect the accurate diacritics.
It was printed “usūl” and should have been “uṣūl”
It was printed “hadith” and should have been “ḥadīth”
It was printed “Muhammad” and should have been “Muḥammad”
It was printed “Ahmad” and should have been “Aḥmad”
It was printed “zahara” and should have been “ẓahara”
It was printed “al-Tabarī” and should have been “al-Ṭabarī”
It was printed “yadribna” and should have been “yaḍribna”
It was printed “Al-Dahhāk ibn Muzāhim” and should have been “Al-Ḍaḥḥāk ibn Muzāḥim”
It was printed “al-Rahmān” and should have been “al-Raḥmān”
It was printed “ʿAtāʾ ibn Abī Rabāh” and should have been “ʿAṭāʾ ibn Abī Rabāḥ”
It was printed “al-Qurtubī” and should have been “al-Qurṭubī”
It was printed “al-Baydāwī” and should have been “al-Bayḍāwī”
It was printed “mahram” and should have been “maḥram”
It was printed “Mahmūd and should have been “Maḥmūd”

It was printed “hilm” and should have been “ḥilm”
It was printed “qaṭaʿa bihi” and should have been “qaṭaʿa bihi”
It was printed “hamīyyat”and should have been “ḥamīyyat”
It was printed “Masdar” and should have been “maṣdar”
It was printed “harrama” and should have been “ḥarrama”
It was printed “Shaytān” and should have been “Shayṭān”
It was printed “Shaytānu” and should have been “Shayṭānu”
It was printed “yudlil” and should have been “yuḍlil”
It was printed “fi’l ʿard” and should have been “fi’l ʿarḍ”
It was printed “qayyaḍnā and should have been “qayyaḍnā”
It was printed “hudūd” and should have been “ḥudūd”
It was printed “hirāba” and should have been “ḥirāba”
It was printed “al-hayāt and should have been “al-ḥayāt”
It was printed “al-hayāti” and should have been “al-ḥayāti”
It was printed “hubbu” and should have been “ḥubbu”
It was printed “hubb” and should have been “ḥubb”
It was printed “habbaba” and should have been “ḥabbaba”
It was printed “nāzirīn” and should have been “nāẓirīn”
It was printed “masābīh”” and should have been “maṣābīḥ”
It was printed “masābīha” and should have been “maṣābīḥa”
It was printed “yanzurū” and should have been “yanẓurū”
It was printed “yuhshara” and should have been “yuḥshara”
It was printed “duhā” and should have been “ḍuḥā”
It was printed “al-aṭf” and should have been “al-aṭf”
It was printed “hummilnā” and should have been “ḥummilnā”
It was printed “Hijāb”and should have been “Ḥijāb”
It was printed “al-Misrīyya” and should have been “al-Miṣrīyya”
It was printed “Mafātih” and should have been “Mafātiḥ”
It was printed “Haqā’iq” and should have been “Ḥaqā’iq”